Altruistically Unbalanced Kidney Exchange
Although a pilot national live-donor kidney exchange program was recently launched in the US, the kidney shortage is increasing faster than ever. A new solution paradigm is able to incorporate compatible pairs in exchange. In this paper, we consider an exchange framework that has both compatible and in- compatible pairs, and patients are indifferent over compatible pairs. Only two-way exchanges are permitted due to institutional constraints. We explore the structure of Pareto-efficient matchings in this framework. The mathematical structure of this model turns out to be quite novel. We show that under Pareto-efficient matchings, the same number of patients receive transplants, and it is possible to construct Pareto-efficient matchings that match the same incompatible pairs while matching the least number of compatible pairs. We extend the celebrated Gallai-Edmonds Decomposition in the combinatorial optimization literature to our new framework. We also conduct comparative static exercises on how this decomposition changes as new compatible pairs join the pool.
|Date of creation:||01 Oct 2011|
|Date of revision:||30 Jun 2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Boston College, 140 Commonwealth Avenue, Chestnut Hill MA 02467 USA|
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- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez, 2005.
"A Kidney Exchange Clearinghouse in New England,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 376-380, May.
- Tayfun Sönmez & Alvin E. Roth & M. Utku Ünver, 2007.
"Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 97(3), pages 828-851, June.
- Ãœnver, M. Utku & SÃ¶nmez, Tayfun & Roth, Alvin, 2007. "Efficient Kidney Exchange: Coincidence of Wants in a Markets with Compatibility-Based Preferences," Scholarly Articles 2562809, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2004.
"Pairwise Kidney Exchange,"
NBER Working Papers
10698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Game Theory and Information 0408001, EconWPA, revised 16 Feb 2005.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000350, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sönmez & M. Utku Ünver, 2004. "Pairwise Kidney Exchange," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 620, Boston College Department of Economics.
- Abdulkadiroglu, Atila & Sonmez, Tayfun, 1999. "House Allocation with Existing Tenants," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 233-260, October.
- Saidman, Susan L. & Roth, Alvin E. & Sonmez, Tayfun & Unver, M. Utku & Delmonico, Francis L., 2014. "Increasing the Opportunity of Live Kidney Donation by Matching for Two and Three Way Exchanges," MPRA Paper 58247, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- YIlmaz, Özgür, 2011. "Kidney exchange: An egalitarian mechanism," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 592-618, March.
- Alvin E. Roth & Tayfun Sonmez & M. Utku Unver, 2003.
Game Theory and Information
- Moulin, Herve & Bogomolnaia, Anna, 2001.
"Random Matching under Dichotomous Preferences,"
2001-03, Rice University, Department of Economics.
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