Why the count de Borda cannot beat the Marquis de Condorcet
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Volume (Year): 25 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (October)
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Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Michael Dummett, 1998. "The Borda count and agenda manipulation," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 15(2), pages 289-296.
- repec:cup:apsrev:v:82:y:1988:i:04:p:1231-1244_19 is not listed on IDEAS
- Donald G. Saari & Vincent R. Merlin, 2000. "A geometric examination of Kemeny's rule," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(3), pages 403-438.