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Voting on Road Congestion Policy

  • Russo, Antonio

We study the political economy of urban traffic policy. We consider a city and its suburbs. The city decides, by majority voting, on a parking charge in the Central Business District (CBD) and restrictions on road space dedicated to cars. City and suburbs vote on road pricing in the CBD. Results include the following. When the majority of city voters prefers cars to public transport sufficiently more than the average voter, car charges and space restrictions are smaller than optimal. If the suburbs' voters have stronger preferences for cars than the city's, road pricing has the lowest political support among the instruments we consider. Tax exporting and imperfect government coordination may inflate total charges. This is welfare enhancing if it compensates for voters' opposition to car restraining policies. Earmarking charge revenues for public transport is welfare enhancing only if they are topped up by extra funds from a national government.

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Paper provided by Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) in its series TSE Working Papers with number 12-310.

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Date of creation: May 2012
Date of revision: Nov 2012
Handle: RePEc:tse:wpaper:25844
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Web page: http://www.tse-fr.eu/

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  1. De Donder, Philippe & Le Breton, Michel & Peluso, Eugenio, 2010. "Majority Voting in Multidimensional Policy Spaces: Kramer-Shepsle versus Stackelberg," IDEI Working Papers 593, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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  8. Richard Arnott & Eren Inci, 2005. "An Integrated Model of Downtown Parking and Traffic Congestion," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 608, Boston College Department of Economics.
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  12. King, David & Manville, Michael & Shoup, Donald, 2007. "The political calculus of congestion pricing," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt9js9z8gz, University of California Transportation Center.
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  16. Marcucci, Edoardo & Marini, Marco, 2005. "Road pricing as a citizen-candidate game," MPRA Paper 29293, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  17. Eva Gutiérrez-i-Puigarnau & Jos van Ommeren, 2009. "Labour Supply and Commuting," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 222, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
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