Majority Voting and the Single Crossing Property when Voters Belong to Separate Groupes The Role of the Continuity and Strict Monotonicity Assumptions
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- De Donder, Philippe, 2010. "Majority Voting and the Single Crossing Property when Voters Belong to Separate Groupes The Role of the Continuity and Strict Monotonicity Assumptions," IDEI Working Papers 693, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jan 2012.
References listed on IDEAS
- Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
- Russo, Antonio, 2013. "Voting on road congestion policy," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 707-724.
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- De Donder, Philippe, 2013. "Majority voting and the single-crossing property when voters belong to separate groups," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 523-525.
More about this item
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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