Majority voting and the single-crossing property when voters belong to separate groups
We provide conditions under which a Condorcet winner exists when voters are exogenously distributed in groups, with preferences satisfying the single-crossing property separately inside each group. We also show that the majority voting social preference is acyclic.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
- De Donder, Philippe, 2010.
"Majority Voting and the Single Crossing Property when Voters Belong to Separate Groupes The Role of the Continuity and Strict Monotonicity Assumptions,"
IDEI Working Papers
693, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised Jan 2012.
- De Donder, Philippe, 2010. "Majority Voting and the Single Crossing Property when Voters Belong to Separate Groupes The Role of the Continuity and Strict Monotonicity Assumptions," TSE Working Papers 265, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Jan 2012.
- Milgrom, Paul & Shannon, Chris, 1994. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(1), pages 157-180, January.
- Milgrom, P. & Shannon, C., 1991. "Monotone Comparative Statics," Papers 11, Stanford - Institute for Thoretical Economics.
- Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)