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An alternative approach to income taxation

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  • An, Zhiyong

Abstract

We take an alternative approach to income taxation in this paper. We view the income tax schedule as the outcome of a voting process, rather than the optimal choice of a “benevolent social planner”. We show that it is very likely for majority voting to lead to the adoption of a regressive income tax schedule, depending on the per capita government revenue requirement and the mean productivity of the population, which is in sharp contrast with the result derived from the traditional “benevolent social planner” approach to income taxation; and that given the adoption of a regressive income tax schedule, the income tax schedule would become less regressive as the ratio of the per capita government revenue requirement over the mean productivity of the population increases. Our work might shed some light on both the prevalent adoption of regressive state tax systems and the cross-state difference in terms of tax systems.

Suggested Citation

  • An, Zhiyong, 2013. "An alternative approach to income taxation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 30(C), pages 875-878.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:30:y:2013:i:c:p:875-878
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econmod.2012.11.015
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
    2. Christian Traxler, 2009. "Voting over taxes: the case of tax evasion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 43-58, July.
    3. Romer, Thomas, 1975. "Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 163-185, February.
    4. Traxler, Christian, 2012. "Majority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 1-9.
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    8. Rainald Borck, 2009. "Voting on redistribution with tax evasion," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 32(3), pages 439-454, March.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Day, Creina & Day, Garth, 2021. "Aging, voters and lower income tax: A role for pension design," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 560-569.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Majority voting; Income taxation;

    JEL classification:

    • H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue

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