Voting over tax schedules in the presence of tax avoidance
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References listed on IDEAS
- Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Besfamille, Martin & De Donder, Philippe & Lozachmeur, Jean-Marie, 2009. "The Political Economy of the (Weak) Enforcement of Sales Tax," CEPR Discussion Papers 7108, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Christian Traxler, 2009. "Voting over taxes: the case of tax evasion," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 140(1), pages 43-58, July.
- Borck, Rainald, 2004. "Stricter enforcement may increase tax evasion," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(3), pages 725-737, September.
More about this item
KeywordsTax avoidance; Majority voting; Order-restricted preferences; Single-crossing condition;
- C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- H20 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - General
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2003-06-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2003-06-16 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-PBE-2003-06-16 (Public Economics)
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