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Leisure and redistribution

  • Hodler, Roland

We study a model with majority voting on redistribution in which agents differ in their skills and their preferences for leisure. Redistribution is generous and average labor supply low if the decisive voter has relatively strong preferences for leisure, while redistribution is limited and average labor supply high if the decisive voter has relatively weak preferences for leisure. Given differences in the preference distributions due to cultural differences or positive complementarities in leisure, our model thus provides an explanation for the substantial differences in redistribution and average working hours between the United States and continental Western Europe.

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Journal of Political Economy.

Volume (Year): 24 (2008)
Issue (Month): 2 (June)
Pages: 354-363

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Handle: RePEc:eee:poleco:v:24:y:2008:i:2:p:354-363
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505544

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