A loglinear tax and transfer function: majority voting and optimal rates
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KeywordsWelfare and Poverty Taxation and Subsidies Fiscal Policies;
- I31 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - General Welfare, Well-Being
- H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
- H31 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - Household
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