Majority support for progressive income taxation with corner preferences
This paper studies voting over quadratic taxation when income is fixed and taxation non distortionary. The set of feasible taxes is compact and self-interested voters have corner preferences. We first show that, if a majority winning tax policy exists, it involves maximum progressivity. We then give a necessary and sufficient condition on the income distribution for a majority winner to exist. This condition appears to be satisfied for a large class of distribution functions.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
|Date of creation:|
|Date of revision:|
|Note:||In : Public Choice, 118, 437-449, 2004.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium)|
Fax: +32 10474304
Web page: http://www.uclouvain.be/core
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- John E. Roemer, .
"The Democratic Political Economy Of Progressive Income Taxation,"
Department of Economics
97-11, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- John E. Roemer, 1999. "The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(1), pages 1-20, January.
- John E. Roemer, 1997. "The Democratic Political Economy of Progressive Income Taxation," Discussion Papers 97-03, University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
- John Roemer, 2003. "The Democratic Political Economy Of Progressive Income Taxation," Working Papers 9711, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 2003.
"The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2491-2505, October.
- De Donner, P. & Hindriks, J., 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Papers 00-542, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- DE DONDER, Philippe & HINDRIKS, Jean, . "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," CORE Discussion Papers RP 1673, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Working Papers 416, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Kranich, Laurence, 2001. " Altruism and the Political Economy of Income Taxation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 3(4), pages 455-69.
- Snyder, James M. & Kramer, Gerald H., 1988.
"Fairness, self-interest, and the politics of the progressive income tax,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 197-230, July.
- Kramer, Gerald H. & Snyder, James M., 1983. "Fairness, Self-Interest, and the Politics of the Progressive Income Tax," Working Papers 498, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Myles, Gareth D., 2000. "On the optimal marginal rate of income tax," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 113-119, January.
- Berliant, M. & Gouveia, M., 1991. "On Political Economy of Income Taxation," RCER Working Papers 288, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Marhuenda, Francisco & Ortuno-Ortin, Ignacio, 1995. "Popular support for progressive taxation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 48(3-4), pages 319-324, June.
- Romer, Thomas, 1975. "Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 163-185, February.
- Young, H Peyton, 1990. "Progressive Taxation and Equal Sacrifice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 253-66, March.
- Roberts, Kevin W. S., 1977. "Voting over income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 8(3), pages 329-340, December.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1691. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Alain GILLIS)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.