On optimal income taxation with heterogeneous work preferences
This paper considers the problem of optimal income taxation when individuals are assumed to differ with respect to their earnings potential and work preferences. A numerical method for solving this two-dimensional problem has been developed. We assume an additive utility function, and utilitarian social objectives. Rather than solve the first order conditions associated with the problem, we directly compute the best tax function which can be written in terms of a second order B-spline function. Among our findings are that marginal tax rates are higher than one might anticipate, and that very little bunching occurs at the optimum.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 3 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=1742-7355|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/subs.asp?ref=1742-7355|