Capital Income Taxes with Heterogeneous Discount Rates
With heterogeneity in both skills and discount factors, the Atkinson- Stiglitz theorem that savings should not be taxed does not hold. In a model with heterogeneity of preferences at each earnings level, introducing a savings tax on high earners or a savings subsidy on low earners increases welfare, regardless of the correlation between ability and discount factor. Extending Emmanuel Saez (2002), a uniform savings tax increases welfare if that correlation is sufficiently high. Key for the results is that types who value future consumption less are more tempted by a lower paid job. Some optimal tax results and empirical evidence are presented. (JEL D14, H21, H24)
Volume (Year): 3 (2011)
Issue (Month): 4 (November)
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