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Da Bentham alla tassazione ottimale

  • Ruggero Paladini
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    This paper describes the rebirth of the utilitarian approach, with the social welfare function a là Bentham, after the crisis due to the emergence of the ordinalist microeconomic analysis. It is shown that Vickrey in 1945 had already anticipated the themes developed earlier by Harsanyi and later by Mirrlees. After a description of Mirrlees’s work, the paper discusses the situation in which you can use personalized lump-sum taxes, showing that there are critical consequences. The paper criticizes Mankiw’s thesis against the utilitarian approach, concluding with some policy prescriptions.

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    File URL: http://www.digef.uniroma1.it/sites/default/files/pubblicazioni/economia/research-papers/e-pfrp-n-2.pdf
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    Paper provided by Istituto di Economia e Finanza, DIGEF, Sapienza University of Rome in its series Public Finance Research Papers with number 2.

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    Length: 60 pages
    Date of creation: May 2014
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:gfe:pfrp00:0002
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    1. Ravi Kanbur & Michael Keen & Matti Tuomala, 1990. "Optimal Non-Linear Income Taxation for the Alleviation of Income Poverty," Working Papers 799, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    2. N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew C. Weinzierl, 2009. "The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian Income Redistribution," Harvard Business School Working Papers 09-139, Harvard Business School.
    3. N. Gregory Mankiw & Matthew Weinzierl & Danny Yagan, 2009. "Optimal Taxation in Theory and Practice," NBER Working Papers 15071, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Andrés Erosa & Martin Gervais, 1998. "Optimal Taxation in Life-Cycle Economies," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers 9812, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
    5. Ruggero Paladini, 2005. "Alcuni aspetti del dibattito sui principi del sacrificio tra gli autori italiani," STUDI ECONOMICI, FrancoAngeli Editore, vol. 2005(87).
    6. Alesina, Alberto F & Ichino, Andrea & Karabarbounis, Loukas, 2007. "Gender Based Taxation and the Division of Family Chores," CEPR Discussion Papers 6591, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Robert Moffitt, 2006. "Welfare work Requirements with Paternalistic Government Preferences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(515), pages F441-F458, November.
    8. Hammond,Peter, 1988. "Theoretical progress in public economics: A provocative assessment," Discussion Paper Serie A 171, University of Bonn, Germany.
    9. Katherine Cuff, 1998. "Optimality of Workfare with Heterogeneous Preferences," Working Papers 968, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
    10. Sören Blomquist & Luca Micheletto, 2008. "Age-related Optimal Income Taxation," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 110(1), pages 45-71, 03.
    11. Beaudry, Paul & Blackorby, Charles, 2004. "Taxes And Employment Subsidies In Optimal Redistribution Programs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 708, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    12. George J. Stigler, 1950. "The Development of Utility Theory. I," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58, pages 307.
    13. Hahn, Frank H., 1973. "On optimum taxation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 96-106, February.
    14. Gervais, Martin, 2009. "On the optimality of age-dependent taxes and the progressive U.S. tax system," Discussion Paper Series In Economics And Econometrics 0905, Economics Division, School of Social Sciences, University of Southampton.
    15. Tuomala, Matti, 1990. "Optimal Income Tax and Redistribution," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198286059, March.
    16. Michael J. Boskin & Eytan Sheshinski, 1979. "Optimal Tax Treatment of the Family: Married Couples," NBER Working Papers 0368, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Ritva Tarkiainen & Matti Tuomala, 2007. "On optimal income taxation with heterogeneous work preferences," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 3(1), pages 35-46.
    18. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
    19. De Vincenti Claudio & Paladini Ruggero, 2009. "Personal Income Tax Design for Italy: Lessons from the Theory," Rivista italiana degli economisti, Società editrice il Mulino, issue 1, pages 7-46.
    20. Scheve, Kenneth & Stasavage, David, 2010. "The Conscription of Wealth: Mass Warfare and the Demand for Progressive Taxation," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(04), pages 529-561, October.
    21. Matthew Weinzierl, 2011. "The Surprising Power of Age-Dependent Taxes," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(4), pages 1490-1518.
    22. Aronsson, Thomas & Sjögren, Tomas, 2006. "Optimal Income Taxation and Social Norms in the Labor Market," Umeå Economic Studies 672, Umeå University, Department of Economics.
    23. Diamond, Peter A & Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production II: Tax Rules," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 61(3), pages 261-78, June.
    24. Arrow, Kenneth J, 1977. "Extended Sympathy and the Possibility of Social Choice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 67(1), pages 219-25, February.
    25. Dasgupta, Partha & Hammond, Peter, 1980. "Fully progressive taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 141-154, April.
    26. Mikhail Golosov & Maxim Troshkin & Aleh Tsyvinski, 2011. "Optimal Dynamic Taxes," NBER Working Papers 17642, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    27. Sadka, Efraim, 1976. "On Progressive Income Taxation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 66(5), pages 931-35, December.
    28. Philippe Chone & Guy Laroque, 2010. "Negative Marginal Tax Rates and Heterogeneity," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2532-47, December.
    29. Varian, Hal R., 1980. "Redistributive taxation as social insurance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 49-68, August.
    30. Samuelson, Paul A, 1974. "Complementarity-An Essay on the 40th Anniversary of the Hicks-Allen Revolution in Demand Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1255-89, December.
    31. Diamond, P., 1994. "Optimal Income Taxation: An Exemple with a U-Shaped Pattern of Optimal Marginal Tax Rates," Working papers 94-14, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    32. Robin Boadway & Maurice Marchand & Pierre Pestieau & María del Mar Racionero, 2002. "Optimal Redistribution with Heterogeneous Preferences for Leisure," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 4(4), pages 475-498, October.
    33. John C. Harsanyi, 1953. "Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of Risk-taking," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 61, pages 434.
    34. Agnar Sandmo, 1999. "Asymmetric Information and Public Economics: The Mirrlees-Vickrey Nobel Prize," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 13(1), pages 165-180, Winter.
    35. Atkinson, A. B. & Stiglitz, J. E., 1976. "The design of tax structure: Direct versus indirect taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1-2), pages 55-75.
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