Welfare work Requirements with Paternalistic Government Preferences
Work requirements in means-tested transfer programmes have grown in importance in the US and in some other countries. The theoretical literature which considers their possible optimality generally operates within a traditional welfarist framework where some function of the utility of the poor is maximised. Here we consider a case where society instead has preferences over the actual work allocations of welfare recipients. Optimality of work requirements is shown to be possible but depends on the accuracy of the screening mechanism which assigns work requirements. Numerical simulations show that accuracy must be high for optimality. Earnings subsidies may also be optimal. Copyright 2006 The Author(s). Journal compilation Royal Economic Society 2006.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 116 (2006)
Issue (Month): 515 (November)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Office of the Secretary-General, Rm E35, The Bute Building, Westburn Lane, St Andrews, KY16 9TS, UK|
Phone: +44 1334 462479
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/asp/journal.asp?ref=0013-0133|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992. "Workfare versus Welfare Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 249-61, March.
- Louis Kaplow, 2006.
"Optimal Income Transfers,"
NBER Working Papers
12284, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Timothy Besley & Stephen Coate, 1995.
"The Design of Income Maintenance Programmes,"
Review of Economic Studies,
Oxford University Press, vol. 62(2), pages 187-221.
- Paul Beaudry & Charles Blackorby, 1998.
"Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs,"
NBER Working Papers
6355, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Paul Beaudry & Charles Blackorby & Dezsö Szalay, 2009. "Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 216-42, March.
- Beaudry, Paul & Blackorby, Charles, 2004. "Taxes And Employment Subsidies In Optimal Redistribution Programs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 708, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Beaudry, Paul & Blackorby, Charles, 2006. "Taxes and Employment Subsidies in Optimal Redistribution Programs," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 766, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Robert A. Moffitt, 2003.
"The Negative Income Tax and the Evolution of U.S. Welfare Policy,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives,
American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 119-140, Summer.
- Robert A. Moffitt, 2003. "The Negative Income Tax and the Evolution of U.S. Welfare Policy," NBER Working Papers 9751, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Emmanuel Saez, 2002. "Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 117(3), pages 1039-1073.
- Sheshinski, E. & Diamond, P., 1992.
"Economic Aspects of Optimal Disability Benefits,"
92-5, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Maderner, N. & Rochet, J.C., 1996.
"Is It Legitimate to Encourage Work Sharing?,"
96.404, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Keane, Michael & Moffitt, Robert, 1998.
"A Structural Model of Multiple Welfare Program Participation and Labor Supply,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 39(3), pages 553-89, August.
- Michael P. Keane & Robert A. Moffitt, 1995. "A structural model of multiple welfare program participation and labor supply," Working Papers 557, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- M. Keane & R. Moffitt, . "A structural model of multiple welfare program participation and labor supply," Institute for Research on Poverty Discussion Papers 1080-96, University of Wisconsin Institute for Research on Poverty.
- M. Keane & R. Mofitt, 1995. "A Structural Model of Multiple Welfare Program Participation and Labor Supply," Working Papers 95-4, Brown University, Department of Economics.
- Fortin, B. & Truchon, M., 1990.
"On Reforming the Welfare System: Workfare Meets the Negative Income Tax,"
Cahiers de recherche
9016, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
- Fortin, Bernard & Truchon, Michel & Beausejour, Louis, 1993. "On reforming the welfare system : Workfare meets the negative income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 119-151, June.
- Salanie, Bernard, 2002. "Optimal demogrants with imperfect tagging," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 319-324, May.
- Robert A. Moffitt, 2003. "Means-Tested Transfer Programs in the United States," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number moff03-1.
- J. A. Mirrlees, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 38(2), pages 175-208.
- Hanming Fang & Michael P. Keane, 2004. "Assessing the Impact of Welfare Reform on Single Mothers," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 35(1), pages 1-116.
- Katherine Cuff, 2000.
"Optimality of workfare with heterogeneous preferences,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,
Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(1), pages 149-174, February.
- Katherine Cuff, 1998. "Optimality of Workfare with Heterogeneous Preferences," Working Papers 968, Queen's University, Department of Economics.
- Brett, Craig, 1998. "Who Should Be on Workfare? The Use of Work Requirements as Part of an Optimal Tax Mix," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 607-22, October.
- Guy Laroque, 2005. "Income Maintenance and Labor Force Participation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 73(2), pages 341-376, 03.
- Chone, Philippe & Laroque, Guy, 2005.
"Optimal incentives for labor force participation,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 89(2-3), pages 395-425, February.
- Parsons, Donald O., 1996. "Imperfect 'tagging' in social insurance programs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 183-207, October.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:116:y:2006:i:515:p:f441-f458. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing)or (Christopher F. Baum)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.