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Optimal demogrants with imperfect tagging

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  • Salanie, Bernard

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  • Salanie, Bernard, 2002. "Optimal demogrants with imperfect tagging," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 75(3), pages 319-324, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:75:y:2002:i:3:p:319-324
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Parsons, Donald O., 1996. "Imperfect 'tagging' in social insurance programs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(1-2), pages 183-207, October.
    2. Diamond, Peter & Sheshinski, Eytan, 1995. "Economic aspects of optimal disability benefits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 1-23, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jacquet, Laurence, 2006. "Optimal disability assistance when fraud and stigma matter," Queen's Economics Department Working Papers 273574, Queen's University - Department of Economics.
    2. Sean Slack & David Ulph, 2014. "Optimal Universal and Categorical Benefits with Classification Errors and Imperfect Enforcement," Discussion Paper Series, School of Economics and Finance 201411, School of Economics and Finance, University of St Andrews.
    3. Erwin OOGHE & Andreas PEICHL, 2010. "Fair and efficient taxation under partial control: theory and evidence," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces10.32, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
    4. Oliver Denk & Jean‐Baptiste Michau, 2018. "Optimal Social Security with Imperfect Tagging," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 120(3), pages 717-762, July.
    5. Robert Moffitt, 2006. "Welfare work Requirements with Paternalistic Government Preferences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(515), pages 441-458, November.
    6. Laurence Jacquet, 2014. "Tagging and redistributive taxation with imperfect disability monitoring," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 42(2), pages 403-435, February.
    7. Slack, Sean & Ulph, David, 2014. "Optimal Universal and Categorical Benefits with Classification Errors and Imperfect Enforcement," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon TN 2015-13, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    8. Erwin Ooghe & Andreas Peichl, 2015. "Fair and Efficient Taxation under Partial Control," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 125(589), pages 2024-2051, December.
    9. Laurence Jacquet, 2010. "Take it or Leave it: Take-up, Optimal Transfer Programs, and Monitoring," CESifo Working Paper Series 3018, CESifo.
    10. Laurence JACQUET, 2009. "Take it or Leave it : Optimal Transfer Programs, Monitoring and Takeup," LIDAM Discussion Papers IRES 2009003, Université catholique de Louvain, Institut de Recherches Economiques et Sociales (IRES).
    11. Michel, DE VROEY, 2006. "Getting Rid of Keynes ? A reflection on the history of macroeconomics," Discussion Papers (ECON - Département des Sciences Economiques) 2006051, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
    12. Slack, Sean & Ulph, David, 2014. "Optimal Universal and Categorical Benefits with Classification Errors and Imperfect Enforcement," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-13, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    13. Rehn, Eric, 2007. "Imperfect Tagging Revisited," Working Papers 2007:2, Lund University, Department of Economics.

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