IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/povpop/v6y2014i1p71-79.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cash Transfers for Poverty Alleviation Under Double Asymmetric Information Regarding Income and Productivity

Author

Listed:
  • Yui Nakamura

Abstract

When a government makes cash transfers as a part of a poverty alleviation program, it often faces a screening problem in identifying those individuals who most deserve to be supported financially because individual productivity levels cannot be monitored. Self‐selection mechanisms such as in‐kind transfers have been proven to be able to overcome this screening problem when individual income levels can be observed by the government. However, especially in developing countries, it is also often difficult for the government to observe individual income. In this article, we thus propose a mechanism that enables cash transfers to support deserving individuals, even though individual income levels cannot be monitored. Moreover, the proposed system allows the government to obtain the necessary financial resources by collecting taxation from productive individuals.

Suggested Citation

  • Yui Nakamura, 2014. "Cash Transfers for Poverty Alleviation Under Double Asymmetric Information Regarding Income and Productivity," Poverty & Public Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(1), pages 71-79, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:povpop:v:6:y:2014:i:1:p:71-79
    DOI: 10.1002/pop4.61
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/pop4.61
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1002/pop4.61?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dollar, David & Kraay, Aart, 2002. "Growth Is Good for the Poor," Journal of Economic Growth, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 195-225, September.
    2. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992. "Workfare versus Welfare Incentive Arguments for Work Requirements in Poverty-Alleviation Programs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(1), pages 249-261, March.
    3. Katherine Cuff, 2000. "Optimality of workfare with heterogeneous preferences," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 33(1), pages 149-174, February.
    4. Robin Boadway & Maurice Marchand & Motohiro Sato, 1998. "Subsidies versus Public Provision of Private Goods as Instruments for Redistribution," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(3), pages 545-564, September.
    5. Brett, Craig, 1998. "Who Should Be on Workfare? The Use of Work Requirements as Part of an Optimal Tax Mix," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(4), pages 607-622, October.
    6. Nichols, Albert L & Zeckhauser, Richard J, 1982. "Targeting Transfers through Restrictions on Recipients," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 372-377, May.
    7. Robert Moffitt, 2006. "Welfare work Requirements with Paternalistic Government Preferences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(515), pages 441-458, November.
    8. Sudhir Anand & Martin Ravallion, 1993. "Human Development in Poor Countries: On the Role of Private Incomes and Public Services," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(1), pages 133-150, Winter.
    9. Parkash Chander & Louis L. Wilde, 1998. "A General Characterization of Optimal Income Tax Enforcement," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 65(1), pages 165-183.
    10. Boadway, Robin & Marchand, Maurice & Sato, Motohiro, 1998. " Subsidies versus Public Provision of Private Goods as Instruments for Redistribution," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(3), pages 545-564, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Yui Nakamura, 2015. "A Cost‐Effective Workfare System Succeeding in Attracting Applicants to Labor Markets," Poverty & Public Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 7(3), pages 240-252, September.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Robin Boadway, 2011. "Viewpoint: Innovations in the theory and practice of redistribution policy," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 44(4), pages 1138-1183, November.
    2. Robin Boadway, 1998. "Redistributing Smarter: Self-Selection, Targeting and Non-Conventional Policy Instruments," Canadian Public Policy, University of Toronto Press, vol. 24(3), pages 365-369, September.
    3. Tomer Blumkin & Yoram Margalioth & Efraim Sadka, 2013. "The desirability of workfare in the presence of misreporting," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(1), pages 71-88, February.
    4. Blumkin, Tomer & Margalioth, Yoram & Sadka, Efraim, 2011. "The Desirability of Workfare in the Presence of Misreporting," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275760, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    5. Sören Blomquist & Vidar Christiansen, 2003. "Is there a Case for Public Provision of Private Goods if Preferences are Heterogeneous? An Example with Day Care," CESifo Working Paper Series 938, CESifo.
    6. Craig Brett & Laurence Jacquet, 2011. "Workforce or Workfare?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3463, CESifo.
    7. Timothy F. Harris, 2018. "Do SNAP Work Requirements Work?," Upjohn Working Papers 19-297, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
    8. Janet Currie & Firouz Gahvari, 2008. "Transfers in Cash and In-Kind: Theory Meets the Data," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 333-383, June.
    9. Timothy F. Harris, 2021. "Do Snap Work Requirements Work?," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(1), pages 72-94, January.
    10. Blomquist, Sören & Christiansen, Vidar, 2004. "Welfare Enhancing Marginal Tax Rates: The Case of Publicly Provided Day Care," Arbetsrapport 2004:6, Institute for Futures Studies.
    11. Greg Leblanc, 2004. "Optimal Income Maintenance and the “Unemployable”," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(3), pages 509-537, August.
    12. Hanming Fang & Peter Norman, 2014. "Toward an efficiency rationale for the public provision of private goods," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(2), pages 375-408, June.
    13. Cairo, Sofie & Mahlstedt, Robert, 2021. "Transparency of the Welfare System and Labor Market Outcomes of Unemployed Workers," IZA Discussion Papers 14940, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    14. Robert Moffitt, 2006. "Welfare work Requirements with Paternalistic Government Preferences," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 116(515), pages 441-458, November.
    15. Craig Brett & Laurence Jacquet, 2015. "Workforce or workfare? The optimal use of work requirements when labour is supplied along the extensive margin," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 48(5), pages 1855-1882, December.
    16. Slack, Sean & Ulph, David, 2014. "Optimal Universal and Categorical Benefits with Classification Errors and Imperfect Enforcement," SIRE Discussion Papers 2015-13, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    17. Claus T. Hansen & Torben Tranaes, 2000. "Optimal Workfare in a Society of Workers and Non-Workers," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0758, Econometric Society.
    18. John William Hatfield & Fuhito Kojima & Yusuke Narita, 2011. "Promoting School Competition Through School Choice: A Market Design Approach," Working Papers 2011-018, Human Capital and Economic Opportunity Working Group.
    19. Peter Fredriksson & Bertil Holmlund, 2006. "Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 20(3), pages 357-386, July.
    20. Persson, Anna & Vikman, Ulrika, 2010. "Dynamic effects of mandatory activation of welfare participants," Working Paper Series, Center for Labor Studies 2010:11, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:povpop:v:6:y:2014:i:1:p:71-79. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1002/(ISSN)1944-2858 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.