Voting Under Ignorance of Job Skills of Unemployed : The Overtaxation bias
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Other versions of this item:
- Laslier, Jean-Francois & Trannoy, Alain & Van Der Straeten, Karine, 2003. "Voting under ignorance of job skills of unemployed: the overtaxation bias," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(3-4), pages 595-626, March.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Berentsen, Aleksander & Bruegger, Esther & Loertscher, Simon, 2008.
"Learning, public good provision, and the information trap,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(5-6), pages 998-1010, June.
- Aleksander Berentsen & Esther Bruegger & Simon Loertscher, 2008. "Learning, public good provision, and the information trap," IEW - Working Papers 371, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich.
- Simula, Laurent & Trannoy, Alain, 2010.
"Optimal income tax under the threat of migration by top-income earners,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 163-173, February.
- Alain Trannoy, Laurent Simula and, 2009. "Optimal Income Tax under the Threat of Migration by Top-Income Earners," Working Paper Series, Center for Fiscal Studies 2009:8, Uppsala University, Department of Economics.
- Christian Bredemeier, 2014.
"Imperfect information and the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(3), pages 561-576, June.
- Bredemeier, Christian, 2010. "Imperfect Information and the Meltzer-Richard Hypothesis," Ruhr Economic Papers 213, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
- De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 2003.
"The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2491-2505, October.
- De Donner, P. & Hindriks, J., 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Papers 00-542, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- DE DONDER, Philippe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2003. "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1673, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Working Papers 416, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2018. "Receiver’s dilemma," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 116-124.
- De Donder, Philippe & Hindriks, Jean, 2003.
"The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(11), pages 2491-2505, October.
- De Donner, P. & Hindriks, J., 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Papers 00-542, Toulouse - GREMAQ.
- Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Working Papers 416, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- DE DONDER, Philippe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2003. "The politics of progressive income taxation with incentive effects," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1673, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Philippe De Donder & Jean Hindriks, 2000. "The Politics of Progressive Income Taxation with Incentive Effects," Working Papers 416, Queen Mary University of London, School of Economics and Finance.
- Hansen, Jes Winther, 2005. "Uncertainty and the size of government," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 88(2), pages 236-242, August.
- Laurent Simula & Alain Trannoy, 2006. "Optimal Linear Income Tax when Agents Vote with their Feet," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 62(3), pages 393-415, September.
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