Existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have other-regarding preferences
In standard political economy models, voters are ‘self-interested’ i.e. care only about ‘own’ utility. However, the emerging evidence indicates that voters often have ‘other-regarding preferences’ (ORP), i.e., in deciding among alternative policies voters care about their payoffs relative to others. We extend a widely used general equilibrium framework in political economy to allow for voters with ORP, as in Fehr- Schmidt (1999). In line with the evidence, these preferences allow voters to exhibit ‘envy’ and ‘altruism’, in addition to the standard concern for ‘own utility’. We give sufficient conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have ORP. This could open the way for an incorporation of ORP in a variety of political economy models. Furthermore, as a corollary, we give more general conditions for the existence of a Condorcet winner when voters have purely selfish preferences.
|Date of creation:||Nov 2007|
|Date of revision:||Jun 2008|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Phone: +44 (0)116 252 2887
Fax: +44 (0)116 252 2908
Web page: http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/economics
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:|| Web: http://www2.le.ac.uk/departments/economics/research/discussion-papers Email: |
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Jean-Robert Tyran & Rupert Sausgruber, 2002.
"A Little Fairness may Induce a Lot of Redistribution in Democracy,"
University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2002
2002-30, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
- Tyran, Jean-Robert & Sausgruber, Rupert, 2006. "A little fairness may induce a lot of redistribution in democracy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 469-485, February.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:lec:leecon:07/16. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Mrs. Alexandra Mazzuoccolo)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.