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On Altruistic and Electoral Income Redistribution: Theory and Data

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  • Dario Debowicz
  • Alejandro Saporiti
  • Yizhi Wang

Abstract

We analyze a political competition model of redistributive policies. We show that the net transfers to the income groups consist of two parts, called altruistic and electoral redistribution. In accordance with the theory, the empirical evidence from a sample of developed and developing democracies strongly supports a positive and significant association between: (i) the net group transfers and the initial income gaps, and (ii) the net transfers to the non-poor (and respectively, the after-tax Gini coefficient) and power sharing disproportionality.

Suggested Citation

  • Dario Debowicz & Alejandro Saporiti & Yizhi Wang, 2018. "On Altruistic and Electoral Income Redistribution: Theory and Data," Economics Discussion Paper Series 1801, Economics, The University of Manchester.
    • Handle: RePEc:man:sespap:1801
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation

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