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Ideology and Corruption

Author

Listed:
  • Paula López-Villalba

    (University of Michigan)

  • Christian Ruzzier

    (Universidad de San Andrés)

Abstract

The most corrupt countries are developing or transition countries, have low income levels, and are closed economies. More interesting, corruption is significantly positively correlated with left-wing governments in a simple cross section of countries – conditional on GDP per capita, income inequality, dominant religion, a recent history of war, and a history of communist rule. Correlation is not causality, however. In this paper, we analyze the direct relevance of government ideology for the extent of corruption, which is a question that has received little attention in the literature so far. Exploiting close electoral races across the world in the post-WWII period in a regression discontinuity design, we compare the levels of corruption in countries where the left wins and loses elections by a small margin, and find that electing a left-wing government has a significant and positive effect on corruption. We also link our results to extended government intervention in the economy and lower-quality bureaucracies under the left.

Suggested Citation

  • Paula López-Villalba & Christian Ruzzier, 2026. "Ideology and Corruption," Working Papers 178, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2026.
  • Handle: RePEc:sad:wpaper:178
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    File URL: https://repec.udesa.edu.ar/pub/econ/doc178.pdf
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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