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Corruption in Developing Countries

  • Benjamin A. Olken

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142)

  • Rohini Pande

    ()

    (Harvard Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138)

Recent years have seen a remarkable expansion in economists' ability to measure corruption. This in turn has led to a new generation of well-identified, microeconomic studies. We review the evidence on corruption in developing countries in light of these recent advances, focusing on three questions: how much corruption is there, what are the efficiency consequences of corruption, and what determines the level of corruption? We find robust evidence that corruption responds to standard economic incentive theory but also that the effects of anticorruption policies often attenuate as officials find alternate strategies to pursue rents.

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Article provided by Annual Reviews in its journal Annual Review of Economics.

Volume (Year): 4 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 (07)
Pages: 479-509

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Handle: RePEc:anr:reveco:v:4:y:2012:p:479-509
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