IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/tpr/jeurec/v6y2008i2-3p487-500.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Putting a Band-Aid on a Corpse: Incentives for Nurses in the Indian Public Health Care System

Author

Listed:
  • Abhijit V. Banerjee
  • Esther Duflo
  • Rachel Glennerster

Abstract

The public Indian health care system is plagued by high staff absence, low effort by providers, and limited use by potential beneficiaries who prefer private alternatives. This artice reports the results of an experiment carried out with a district administration and a nongovernmental organization (NGO). The presence of government nurses in government public health facilities (subcenters and aid-posts) was recorded by the NGO, and the government took steps to punish the worst delinquents. Initially, the monitoring system was extremely effective. This shows that nurses are responsive to financial incentives. But after a few months, the local health administration appears to have undermined the scheme from the inside by letting the nurses claim an increasing number of "exempt days." Eighteen months after its inception, the program had become completely ineffective. (JEL: D10, I10, J30) (c) 2008 by the European Economic Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Abhijit V. Banerjee & Esther Duflo & Rachel Glennerster, 2008. "Putting a Band-Aid on a Corpse: Incentives for Nurses in the Indian Public Health Care System," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 6(2-3), pages 487-500, 04-05.
  • Handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:6:y:2008:i:2-3:p:487-500
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1542-4774/issues
    File Function: link to full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Blog mentions

    As found by EconAcademics.org, the blog aggregator for Economics research:
    1. Educational Romanticism & Economic Development
      by pseudoerasmus in Pseudoerasmus on 2015-06-15 06:16:07

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Abhijit Banerjee & Rema Hanna, 2012. "Corruption," Introductory Chapters,in: Sendhil Mullainathan & Robert Gibbons & John Roberts (ed.), The Handbook of Organizational Economics Princeton University Press.
      • Hanna, Rema N. & Mullainathan, Sendhil & Banerjee, Abhijit, 2012. "Corruption," Scholarly Articles 8830779, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
      • Abhijit Banerjee & Sendhil Mullainathan & Rema Hanna, 2012. "Corruption," NBER Working Papers 17968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
      • Abhijit Banerjee & Rema Hanna & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2012. "Corruption," Working Papers id:4952, eSocialSciences.
      • Banerjee, Abhijit & Hanna, Rema & Mullainathan, Sendhil, 2012. "Corruption," Working Paper Series rwp12-023, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.
    2. Erlend Berg & Maitreesh Ghatak & Manjula Ramachandra & Rajasekhar Durgam & Sanchari Roy, 2013. "Motivating Knowledge Agents: Can Incentive Pay Overcome Social Distance?," CSAE Working Paper Series 2013-06, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    3. Dhaliwal, Iqbal & Hanna, Rema, 2017. "The devil is in the details: The successes and limitations of bureaucratic reform in India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 124(C), pages 1-21.
    4. Jishnu Das & Alaka Holla & Aakash Mohpal & Karthik Muralidharan, 2016. "Quality and Accountability in Health Care Delivery: Audit-Study Evidence from Primary Care in India," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 106(12), pages 3765-3799, December.
    5. Muralidharan, Karthik & Das, Jishnu & Holla, Alaka & Mohpal, Aakash, 2017. "The fiscal cost of weak governance: Evidence from teacher absence in India," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 116-135.
    6. Andreoni, James & Callen, Michael & Hussain Jaffar, Karrar & Khan, Muhammad Yasir & Sprenger, Charles, 2016. "Using Preference Estimates to Customize Incentives: An Application to Polio Vaccination Drives in Pakistan," CEPR Discussion Papers 11137, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    7. Brollo, Fernanda & Kaufmann, Katja Maria & Ferrara, Eliana La, 2017. "Learning about the Enforcement of Conditional Welfare Programs: Evidence from Brazil," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 317, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
    8. Fitzsimons, Emla & Malde, Bansi & Mesnard, Alice & Vera-Hernández, Marcos, 2016. "Nutrition, information and household behavior: Experimental evidence from Malawi," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(C), pages 113-126.
    9. Rema Hanna & Vivi Alatas & Abhijit Banerjee & Benjamin A. Olken & Ririn Purnamasari & Matthew Wai-Poi & Christian Daude, 2012. "Ordeal Mechanisms in Targeting: Theory and Evidence from a Field Experiment in Indonesia," CID Working Papers 254, Center for International Development at Harvard University.
    10. Fox, Jonathan A., 2015. "Social Accountability: What Does the Evidence Really Say?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 346-361.
    11. Chicoine, Luke & Guzman, Juan Carlos, 2017. "Increasing Rural Health Clinic Utilization with SMS Updates: Evidence from a Randomized Evaluation in Uganda," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 419-430.
    12. Coffey, Diane, 2014. "Costs and consequences of a cash transfer for hospital births in a rural district of Uttar Pradesh, India," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 114(C), pages 89-96.
    13. repec:eee:aosoci:v:63:y:2017:i:c:p:42-59 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. repec:eee:pubeco:v:156:y:2017:i:c:p:150-169 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Singh, Nirvikar, 2008. "Decentralization and Public Delivery of Health Care Services in India," MPRA Paper 7869, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D10 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - General
    • I10 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - General
    • J30 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tpr:jeurec:v:6:y:2008:i:2-3:p:487-500. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Kristin Waites). General contact details of provider: http://www.mitpressjournals.org/jeea .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.