Performance-Based Wages in Tax Collection: The Brazilian Tax Collection Reform and Its Effects
We use panel data from the Brazilian tax collection authority to examine the effects of a major incentive reform instituted in 1989 to improve tax enforcement. Beforehand, fine collections per inspection were relatively stable; however, a striking trend break occurred afterwards, which we attribute to the incentive reform not to changes in the macroeconomy or personal and corporate income tax rates. Our estimates suggest the growth in fines per inspection after the reform is about 75% above what it would have been without it and that there is substantial heterogeneity in the impact of the reform across tax regions.
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 111 (2001)
Issue (Month): 468 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: 2 Dean Trench Street, Westminster, SW1P 3HE|
Phone: +44 20 3137 6301
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/asp/journal.asp?ref=0013-0133|