Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach
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More about this item
KeywordsCorruption; Principal–agent game; Monetary incentives;
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
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