Corruption, Complexity and Governance
Improvements in anticorruption have mostly stagnated. We suggest a methodological failure as the main cause: the analysis of corruption as a complex phenomenon has been neglected. We draw on the available literature on corruption to show its complex and systemic character, which includes heterogeneous elements, nontrivial relationships, unpredictable evolution and changing dynamics. We conclude that governance instruments are vital elements of whichever anticorruption strategy is incorporated.
|Date of creation:||01 Oct 2007|
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