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Government fragmentation versus fiscal decentralization and corruption

  • Rajeev Goel

    ()

  • Michael Nelson

    ()

This research adds to the literature on the nexus between government and corruption by examining further the influence of government decentralization on corruption. Previous research has focused primarily on fiscal decentralization. We bring additional evidence to bear for the United States by addressing whether the structure of local governments – measured both in terms of the scope of services offered and the size of the population served – has a bearing on corruption within the state. Results show that government decentralization does not necessarily reduce corruption – the type of decentralization matters. Specifically, we find that more general-purpose governments consistently contribute to corruption. In contrast, the effect of special-purpose governments on corruption is mixed. The findings uniquely flush out the tension between fiscal decentralization and fragmental local government structures in terms of impacts on corruption. Beyond this, we find that the influences of various government enforcement agencies on corruption, including police, judiciary and corrections, vary. Other corruption determinants generally support the literature. Policy implications are discussed.

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11127-010-9666-x
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Public Choice.

Volume (Year): 148 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 471-490

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Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:148:y:2011:i:3:p:471-490
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