Tax Administration Reform and Taxpayer Compliance in India
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Other versions of this item:
- Arindam Das-Gupta & Shanto Ghosh & Dilip Mookherjee, 2004. "Tax Administration Reform and Taxpayer Compliance in India," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 11(5), pages 575-600, September.
References listed on IDEAS
- Kahn, Charles M & Silva, Emilson C D & Ziliak, James P, 2001. "Performance-Based Wages in Tax Collection: The Brazilian Tax Collection Reform and Its Effects," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(468), pages 188-205, January.
- Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1986. "Equilibrium Verification and Reporting Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 27(3), pages 739-760, October.
- Mookherjee, Dilip & Png, I P L, 1995. "Corruptible Law Enforcers: How Should They Be Compensated?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 105(428), pages 145-159, January.
CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2017.
"Inequality, Good Governance and Endemic Corruption,"
GLO Discussion Paper Series
142, Global Labor Organization (GLO).
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2017. "Inequality, Good Governance and Endemic Corruption," Departmental Working Papers 201713, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2018. "Inequality, good governance and endemic corruption," WIDER Working Paper Series 019, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Epstein, Gil S. & Gang, Ira N., 2017. "Inequality, Good Governance and Endemic Corruption," IZA Discussion Papers 11149, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2017. "Inequality, Good Governance and Endemic Corruption," Working Papers id:12242, eSocialSciences.
- Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2011. "Is the tax administration just a money machine? Empirical evidence on redistributive politics," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 275-299, September.
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NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-06 (All new papers)
- NEP-CWA-2006-05-06 (Central & Western Asia)
- NEP-PBE-2006-05-06 (Public Economics)
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