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Is the tax administration just a money machine? Empirical evidence on redistributive politics

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Listed author(s):
  • Alejandro Esteller-Moré

    ()

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10101-011-0095-1
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Article provided by Springer in its journal Economics of Governance.

Volume (Year): 12 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (September)
Pages: 275-299

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Handle: RePEc:spr:ecogov:v:12:y:2011:i:3:p:275-299
DOI: 10.1007/s10101-011-0095-1
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10101/PS2

Keywords: Tax administration; Personal income tax; Redistributive politics; H11; H24; H77; H83;

Find related papers by JEL classification:

  • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
  • H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
  • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
  • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration

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  1. Arindam Das-Gupta & Shanto Ghosh & Dilip Mookherjee, 2004. "Tax Administration Reform and Taxpayer Compliance in India," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 11(5), pages 575-600, 09.
  2. Marilyn Young & Michael Reksulak & William F. Shughart, 2001. "The Political Economy of the IRS," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(2), pages 201-220, 07.
  3. Maria Ponomareva & Ekaterina Zhuravskaya, 2004. "Federal tax arrears in Russia "Liquidity problems, federal redistribution or regional resistance?"," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 12(3), pages 373-398, 09.
  4. Burgess, Robin & Stern, Nicholas, 1993. "Taxation and Development," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 31(2), pages 762-830, June.
  5. Cowell, Frank A. & P.F. Gordon, James, 1988. "Unwillingness to pay : Tax evasion and public good provision," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 305-321, August.
  6. Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2005. "Is There a Connection Between the Tax Administration and the Political Power?," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(5), pages 639-663, September.
  7. Schneider, Friedrich, 2005. "Shadow economies around the world: what do we really know?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 21(3), pages 598-642, September.
  8. Hung-jen Wang & Peter Schmidt, 2002. "One-Step and Two-Step Estimation of the Effects of Exogenous Variables on Technical Efficiency Levels," Journal of Productivity Analysis, Springer, vol. 18(2), pages 129-144, September.
  9. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics,in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470 Elsevier.
  10. Wang, Hung-Jen & Ho, Chia-Wen, 2010. "Estimating fixed-effect panel stochastic frontier models by model transformation," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 157(2), pages 286-296, August.
  11. Andreoni, James, 1992. "IRS as loan shark tax compliance with borrowing constraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 35-46, October.
  12. Orviska, Marta & Hudson, John, 2003. "Tax evasion, civic duty and the law abiding citizen," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 83-102, March.
  13. Case, Anne, 2001. "Election goals and income redistribution: Recent evidence from Albania," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 405-423, March.
  14. Dahlberg, M. & Johansson, E., 1999. "On the Vote Purchasing Behavior of Incumbent Governments," Papers 1999:24, Uppsala - Working Paper Series.
  15. Fuest, Clemens, 2000. "The Political Economy of Tax Coordination as a Bargaining Game between Bureaucrats and Politicians," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 103(3-4), pages 357-382, June.
  16. Aigner, Dennis & Lovell, C. A. Knox & Schmidt, Peter, 1977. "Formulation and estimation of stochastic frontier production function models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 6(1), pages 21-37, July.
  17. Greene, William, 2005. "Reconsidering heterogeneity in panel data estimators of the stochastic frontier model," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 126(2), pages 269-303, June.
  18. C. Martinez-Mongay & L.A. Maza Lasierra & J. Yaniz Igal, 2007. "Asset Booms and Tax Receipts: The case of Spain, 1995-2006," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 293, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
  19. Reinganum, Jennifer F. & Wilde, Louis L., 1985. "Income tax compliance in a principal-agent framework," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-18, February.
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Cited by:

  1. José María Durán-Cabré & Alejandro Esteller-Moré & Luca Salvadori, 2015. "Empirical evidence on tax cooperation between sub-central administrations," Working Papers 2015/7, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
  2. repec:ieb:wpaper:2013/6/doc2015-7 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Luca Salvadori & José María Durán-Cabré & Alejandro Esteller-Moré, 2012. "Regional Competition On Tax Administration," ERSA conference papers ersa12p184, European Regional Science Association.
  4. José Durán-Cabré & Alejandro Esteller-Moré & Luca Salvadori, 2015. "Empirical evidence on horizontal competition in tax enforcement," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 22(5), pages 834-860, October.
  5. Musharraf Rasool Cyan & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & Violeta Vulovic, 2014. "New approaches to measuring tax effort," Chapters,in: Taxation and Development: The Weakest Link?, chapter 2, pages 27-68 Edward Elgar Publishing.

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