Tax consultants' incentives: A game-theoretic investigation into the behavior of tax consultants, taxpayers, and the tax authority in a setting of tax complexity
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordstax consultant; tax law; game theory;
- H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
- M48 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies
- K34 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Tax Law
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2018-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2018-06-25 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAW-2018-06-25 (Law & Economics)
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