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Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners

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  • Reinganum, Jennifer F
  • Wilde, Louis L

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  • Reinganum, Jennifer F & Wilde, Louis L, 1991. "Equilibrium Enforcement and Compliance in the Presence of Tax Practitioners," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(1), pages 163-181, Spring.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:jleorg:v:7:y:1991:i:1:p:163-81
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    Cited by:

    1. A. Yeliz Kaçamak, 2022. "The role of information aggregators in tax compliance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 29(2), pages 237-285, April.
    2. Grottke, Markus & Lorenz, Johannes, 2017. "Tax consultants' incentives: A game-theoretic investigation into the behavior of tax consultants, taxpayers, and the tax authority in a setting of tax complexity," Passauer Diskussionspapiere, Betriebswirtschaftliche Reihe B-30-17, University of Passau, Faculty of Business and Economics.
    3. repec:dau:papers:123456789/4728 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Marchese, Carla & Venturini, Andrea, 2017. "Is there any Induced Demand for Tax Evasion?," IEL Working Papers 22, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    5. Privileggi, Fabio & Marchese, Carla & Cassone, Alberto, 2001. "Agent's liability versus principal's liability when attitudes toward risk differ," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 181-195, June.
    6. Marisa Ratto & Richard Thomas & David Ulph, 2013. "The Indirect Effects of Auditing Taxpayers," Public Finance Review, , vol. 41(3), pages 317-333, May.
    7. Pickhardt, Michael & Prinz, Aloys, 2014. "Behavioral dynamics of tax evasion – A survey," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 1-19.
    8. Erard, Brian, 1997. "Self-selection with measurement errors A microeconometric analysis of the decision to seek tax assistance and its implications for tax compliance," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 319-356, December.
    9. Privileggi, Fabio & Marchese, Carla & Cassone, Alberto, 1998. "Risk Attitudes and the Shift of Liability from the Principal to the Agent," POLIS Working Papers 1, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    10. Marco Battaglini & Luigi Guiso & Chiara Lacava & Eleonora Patacchini, 2019. "Tax Professionals: Tax-Evasion Facilitators or Information Hubs?," NBER Working Papers 25745, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Paul J. Beck & Jon S. Davis & Woon†Oh Jung, 1996. "Tax Advice and Reporting under Uncertainty: Theory and Experimental Evidence," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 13(1), pages 49-80, March.
    12. Dyck, Daniel & Lorenz, Johannes & Sureth, Caren, 2022. "How do tax technology and controversy expertise affect tax disputes?," arqus Discussion Papers in Quantitative Tax Research 274, arqus - Arbeitskreis Quantitative Steuerlehre.
    13. Lipatov, Vilen, 2012. "Corporate tax evasion: The case for specialists," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(1), pages 185-206.
    14. James Alm, 2019. "What Motivates Tax Compliance?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 353-388, April.
    15. Marisa Ratto & Richard Thomas & David Ulph, 2005. "Tax Compliance as a Social Norm and the Deterrent Effect of Investigations," The Centre for Market and Public Organisation 05/127, The Centre for Market and Public Organisation, University of Bristol, UK.
    16. Jan Hanousek & Filip Palda, 2002. "The Evolution of Tax Evasion in the Czech Republic: A Markov Chain Analysis," Public Economics 0205002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Soufiene Assidi & Khaled Hussainey, 2021. "The effect of tax preparers on corporate tax aggressiveness: Evidence form the UK context," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 26(2), pages 2279-2288, April.
    18. James Alm, 2014. "Does an uncertain tax system encourage üaggressive tax planningý?," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 30-38.
    19. Franzoni, Luigi Alberto, 1998. "Independent auditors as fiscal gatekeepers1," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(4), pages 365-384, December.
    20. Duccio Gamannossi degl’Innocenti & Matthew D. Rablen, 2017. "Tax avoidance and optimal income tax enforcement," IFS Working Papers W17/08, Institute for Fiscal Studies.

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