Corporate Tax Evasion: the Case for Specialists
Economists agree that accounting specialists are helpful in avoiding taxes. We argue that such help can often be called sophisticated evasion. We analyze it in a game of incomplete information played by tax authority, corporate taxpayers and accounting specialist. When sophisticated evasion is very common, marginal changes in enforcement are not effective, so radical measures are needed for improving compliance. Fines on firms as opposed to specialist are more effective in facilitating such measures. When the evasion is modest, auditing and accounting costs as opposed to fines are more effective in curbing it.
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