Optimal Audit Policy and Heterogenous Agents
Frauds can be explained not only in terms of individual willingness to cheat, but may also be driven by opportunities to behave dishonestly. The audit policy should therefore be different for different categories of agents. This paper focuses on the optimal audit policy when there are two categories of agents and shows that the auditor adopts different policies depending on its budget. When resources are quite limited, the auditor sets identical audit probabilities for both types. On the other hand, in most of the cases, the authority should first ensure that people with lower opportunities choose not to commit an offence.
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