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Is Bribery Really Regressive? Bribery’s Costs, Benefits, and Mechanisms

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  • Hunt, Jennifer
  • Laszlo, Sonia

Abstract

We use data on households’ bribery of public officials in Peru and Uganda to analyze the distribution by income of the burden of bribery, the mechanisms leading to it, and the payoffs to bribery. We show the burden of bribery is not borne disproportionately by the poor. Among bribers, the poor do pay a greater share of their income than the rich, but the rich use officials more often, and among users, the rich are more likely to bribe. The benefit of bribery is avoidance of the poor service delivered to clients who refuse to bribe.

Suggested Citation

  • Hunt, Jennifer & Laszlo, Sonia, 2012. "Is Bribery Really Regressive? Bribery’s Costs, Benefits, and Mechanisms," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 355-372.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:wdevel:v:40:y:2012:i:2:p:355-372
    DOI: 10.1016/j.worlddev.2011.06.001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Jennifer Hunt, 2007. "Bribery in Health Care in Peru and Uganda," NBER Working Papers 13034, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Lena Epp & Nastassia Leszczynska, 2017. "Fairness Concerns and Corrupt Decisions :an Experimental Approach," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2017-21, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    3. Mbate, Michael, 2015. "Who bears the burden of bribery? Evidence from Public Service Delivery in Kenya," MPRA Paper 71654, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Marco Castillo & Ragan Petrie & Maximo Torero & Angelino Viceisza, 2014. "Lost In The Mail: A Field Experiment On Crime," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 52(1), pages 285-303, January.
    5. Michaël Aklin & Patrick Bayer & S. Harish & Johannes Urpelainen, 2014. "Who blames corruption for the poor enforcement of environmental laws? Survey evidence from Brazil," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 16(3), pages 241-262, July.
    6. World Bank Group, 2016. "Do the Poor Pay Twice?," World Bank Other Operational Studies 25283, The World Bank.
    7. Estrin, Saul & Korosteleva, Julia & Mickiewicz, Tomasz, 2013. "Which institutions encourage entrepreneurial growth aspirations?," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 564-580.
    8. Ivlevs Artjoms & Hinks Timothy, 2015. "Bribing Behaviour and Sample Selection: Evidence from Post-Socialist Countries and Western Europe," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 235(2), pages 139-167, April.
    9. Ricardo Montero & Gustavo Yamada, . "Exclusión y discriminación étnica en los servicios públicos en el Perú," Chapters of Books,in: Francisco Galarza (ed.), Discriminación en el Perú: Exploraciones en el Estado, la empresa y el mercado laboral., edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 219-278 Fondo Editorial, Universidad del Pacífico.
    10. Artjoms Ivlevs & Timothy Hinks, 2015. "Global economic crisis and corruption," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 162(3), pages 425-445, March.
    11. M. Shahe, Emran & Asadul, Islam & Forhad, Shilpi, 2018. "Distributional Effects of Corruption When Enforcement is Biased: Theory and Evidence from Bribery in Schools in Bangladesh," MPRA Paper 84637, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    12. Justesen, Mogens K. & Bjørnskov, Christian, 2014. "Exploiting the Poor: Bureaucratic Corruption and Poverty in Africa," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 106-115.
    13. Elton Dusha, 2015. "Persistent Inequality, Corruption, and Factor Productivity," Documentos de Trabajo 319, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
    14. Artjoms Ivlevs & Timothy Hinks, 2013. "Global economic crisis and corruption experience: Evidence from transition economies," Working Papers 20131315, Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol.
    15. repec:spr:climat:v:147:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10584-018-2139-9 is not listed on IDEAS
    16. Chongwoo Choe & Ratbek Dzhumashev & Asadul Islam & Zakir H. Khan, 2011. "Corruption and Network in Education: Evidence from the Household Survey Data in Bangladesh," Monash Economics Working Papers 08-11, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    17. Timothy Hinks & Artjoms Ivlevs, 2014. "Communist party membership and bribe paying in transitional economies," Working Papers 20141401, Department of Accounting, Economics and Finance, Bristol Business School, University of the West of England, Bristol.
    18. Emran, M. Shahe & Islam, Asadul & Shilpi, Forhad, 2013. "Admission is free only if your dad is rich! distributional effects of corruption in schools in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6671, The World Bank.

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    Keywords

    bribery; corruption; Peru; Uganda; Latin America; Africa;

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