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Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime

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  • Hunt, Jennifer

    (Rutgers University)

Abstract

I study data on bribes actually paid by individuals to public officials, viewing the results through a theoretical lens that considers the implications of trust networks. A bond of trust may permit an implicit quid pro quo to substitute for a bribe, which reduces corruption. Appropriate networks are more easily established in small towns, by long-term residents of areas with many other long-term residents, and by individuals in regions with many residents their own age. I confirm that the prevalence of bribery is lower under these circumstances, using the International Crime Victim Surveys. I also find that older people, who have had time to develop a network, bribe less. These results highlight the uphill nature of the battle against corruption faced by policy-makers in rapidly urbanizing countries with high fertility. I show that victims of (other) crimes bribe all types of public officials more than non-victims, and argue that both their victimization and bribery stem from a distrustful environment.

Suggested Citation

  • Hunt, Jennifer, 2004. "Trust and Bribery: The Role of the Quid Pro Quo and the Link with Crime," IZA Discussion Papers 1179, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp1179
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    Cited by:

    1. Hunt, Jennifer, 2007. "How corruption hits people when they are down," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 574-589, November.
    2. Francisco Alvarez-Cuadrado, "undated". "A Quantitative Exploration of the Golden Age of European Growth: Structural Change, Public Investment, the Marshall Plan and Intra-European Trade," Working Papers UWEC-2004-15, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
    3. Hunt, Jennifer & Laszlo, Sonia, 2005. "Bribery: Who Pays, Who Refuses, What are the Payoffs?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5251, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Christensen, Hans B. & Maffett, Mark & Rauter, Thomas, 2020. "Reversing the Resource Curse: Foreign Corruption Regulation and Economic Development," Working Papers 304, The University of Chicago Booth School of Business, George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
    5. Frank A.G. den Butter, 2012. "Managing Transaction Costs in the Era of Globalization," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 14748.
    6. Hunt, Jennifer, 2007. "How corruption hits people when they are down," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 574-589, November.
    7. Ricardo Montero & Gustavo Yamada, 2011. "Raza, corrupción y acceso a servicios públicos en el Perú : ¿exclusión o discriminación?," Working Papers 11-03, Centro de Investigación, Universidad del Pacífico.
    8. Leonid V. Peisakhin, 2011. "Field Experimentation and the Study of Corruption," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman & Tina Søreide (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, Volume Two, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. Dzhumashev Ratbek, 2016. "The Role of Income Uncertainty in the Corruption–Growth Nexus," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 16(2), pages 1169-1201, April.
    10. I. Chatterjee & R. Ray, 2012. "Does the evidence on corruption depend on how it is measured? Results from a cross-country study on microdata sets," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 44(25), pages 3215-3227, September.
    11. repec:dau:papers:123456789/5135 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Ricardo Montero & Gustavo Yamada, 2012. "Exclusión y discriminación étnica en los servicios públicos en el Perú," Chapters of Books, in: Francisco Galarza (ed.), Discriminación en el Perú: Exploraciones en el Estado, la empresa y el mercado laboral., edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 219-278, Fondo Editorial, Universidad del Pacífico.
    13. Vartuhí Tonoyan & Robert Strohmeyer & Mohsin Habib & Manfred Perlitz, 2010. "Corruption and Entrepreneurship: How Formal and Informal Institutions Shape Small Firm Behavior in Transition and Mature Market Economies," Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, , vol. 34(5), pages 803-832, September.
    14. Gil S. Epstein & Ira N. Gang, 2010. "Why Pay Taxes When No One Else Does?," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 374-385, May.
    15. Jennifer Hunt, 2006. "Why Are Some Public Officials More Corrupt Than Others?," Chapters, in: Susan Rose-Ackerman (ed.), International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. Rajeev K. Goel & Michael A. Nelson, 2021. "Corrupt encounters of the fairer sex: female entrepreneurs and their corruption perceptions/experience," The Journal of Technology Transfer, Springer, vol. 46(6), pages 1973-1994, December.
    17. Hunt, Jennifer & Laszlo, Sonia, 2012. "Is Bribery Really Regressive? Bribery’s Costs, Benefits, and Mechanisms," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 355-372.
    18. Chongwoo Choe & Ratbek Dzhumashev & Asadul Islam & Zakir H. Khan, 2011. "Corruption and Network in Education: Evidence from the Household Survey Data in Bangladesh," Monash Economics Working Papers 08-11, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    19. Henri Atangana ondoa, 2014. "The determinants of corporate corruption in Cameroon," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(2), pages 938-950.
    20. Benjamín YAMB & Oscar BAYEMI, 2016. "Bribery in Cameroonian Public Hospitals: Who Pays and How Much?," Asian Journal of Social Sciences and Management Studies, Asian Online Journal Publishing Group, vol. 3(1), pages 7-17.
    21. Şeker, Murat & Yang, Judy S., 2014. "Bribery solicitations and firm performance in the Latin America and Caribbean region," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 246-264.
    22. Michael, Bryane & Popov, Maja, 2012. "Do Customs Trade Facilitation Programmes Help Reduce Customs-Related Corruption?," EconStor Preprints 109021, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
    23. Asif Reza Anik & Siegfried Bauer, 2014. "Household Income and Relationships with Different Power Entities as Determinants of Corruption," Contemporary Economics, University of Economics and Human Sciences in Warsaw., vol. 8(3), September.
    24. Chavis, Larry, 2013. "Social networks and bribery: The case of entrepreneurs in Eastern Europe," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 41(1), pages 279-293.
    25. us Swaleheen, Mushfiq, 2008. "Corruption and saving in a panel of countries," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 1285-1301, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    networks; crime; corruption;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • O1 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development
    • D6 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics

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