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Bribery in health care in Uganda

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  • Hunt, Jennifer

Abstract

I examine the role of household permanent income in determining who bribes and how much they bribe in health care in Uganda. I find that rich patients are more likely than other patients to bribe in public health care: doubling household expenditure increases the bribery probability by 1.2 percentage points compared to a bribery rate of 17%. The income elasticity of the bribe amount is about 0.37. Bribes in the Ugandan public sector appear to be fees-for-service extorted from the richer patients amongst those exempted by government policy from paying the official fees. Bribes in the private sector appear to be flat-rate fees paid by patients who do not pay official fees. I do not find evidence that the public health care sector is able to price discriminate less effectively than public institutions with less competition from the private sector.

Suggested Citation

  • Hunt, Jennifer, 2010. "Bribery in health care in Uganda," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(5), pages 699-707, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jhecon:v:29:y:2010:i:5:p:699-707
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Mbate, Michael, 2015. "Who bears the burden of bribery? Evidence from Public Service Delivery in Kenya," MPRA Paper 71654, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Bardey, David & Li, Sanxi & Wu, Yaping, 2015. "Health Care Insurance Payment Policy when the Physician and Patient May Collude," TSE Working Papers 15-572, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    3. Cherecheş, Răzvan M. & Ungureanu, Marius I. & Sandu, Petru & Rus, Ioana A., 2013. "Defining informal payments in healthcare: A systematic review," Health Policy, Elsevier, vol. 110(2), pages 105-114.
    4. Eugenia Amporfu, 2013. "Effect of regulated user fee on quality of healthcare for the poor and the non-poor," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 60(4), pages 357-373, December.
    5. Hunt, Jennifer & Laszlo, Sonia, 2012. "Is Bribery Really Regressive? Bribery’s Costs, Benefits, and Mechanisms," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(2), pages 355-372.
    6. Chongwoo Choe & Ratbek Dzhumashev & Asadul Islam & Zakir H. Khan, 2011. "Corruption and Network in Education: Evidence from the Household Survey Data in Bangladesh," Monash Economics Working Papers 08-11, Monash University, Department of Economics.
    7. Abdallah, Wahid & Chowdhury, Shyamal & Iqbal, Kazi, 2015. "Corruption in the Health Sector: Evidence from Unofficial Consultation Fees in Bangladesh," IZA Discussion Papers 9270, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
    8. Emran, M. Shahe & Islam, Asadul & Shilpi, Forhad, 2013. "Admission is free only if your dad is rich! distributional effects of corruption in schools in developing countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6671, The World Bank.

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