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Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations

Author

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  • Emanuele Colonnelli
  • Mounu Prem
  • Edoardo Teso

Abstract

In all modern bureaucracies, politicians retain some discretion in public employment decisions, which may lead to frictions in the selection process if political connections substitute for individual competence. Relying on detailed matched employer-employee data on the universe of public employees in Brazil over 1997–2014, and on a regression discontinuity design in close electoral races, we establish three main findings. First, political connections are a key and quantitatively large determinant of employment in public organizations, for both bureaucrats and frontline providers. Second, patronage is an important mechanism behind this result. Third, political considerations lead to the selection of less competent individuals.

Suggested Citation

  • Emanuele Colonnelli & Mounu Prem & Edoardo Teso, 2020. "Patronage and Selection in Public Sector Organizations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(10), pages 3071-3099, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:110:y:2020:i:10:p:3071-99
    DOI: 10.1257/aer.20181491
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Mitra Akhtari & Diana Moreira & Laura Trucco, 2022. "Political Turnover, Bureaucratic Turnover, and the Quality of Public Services," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 112(2), pages 442-493, February.
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • J45 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Particular Labor Markets - - - Public Sector Labor Markets
    • O17 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Formal and Informal Sectors; Shadow Economy; Institutional Arrangements

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