Majority Voting and the Single Crossing Property when Voters Belong to Separate Groupes The Role of the Continuity and Strict Monotonicity Assumptions
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|Date of revision:||Jan 2012|
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- Gans, Joshua S. & Smart, Michael, 1996. "Majority voting with single-crossing preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 219-237, February.
- Russo, Antonio, 2013. "Voting on road congestion policy," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(5), pages 707-724.
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