The political calculus of congestion pricing
The political feasibility of using prices to mitigate congestion depends on who receives the toll revenue. We argue that congestion pricing on freeways will have the greatest chance of political success if the revenue is distributed to cities, and particularly to cities through which the freeways pass. In contrast to a number of previous proposals, we argue that cities are stronger claimants for the revenue than either individual drivers or regional authorities. We draw on theory from behavioral economics and political science to explain our proposal, and illustrate it with data from several metropolitan areas. In Los Angeles, where potential congestion toll revenues are estimated to be almost $5 billion a year, distributing toll revenues to cities with freeways could be politically effective and highly progressive.
|Date of creation:||01 Jan 2007|
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- Fiedling, Gordon J. & Klein, Daniel B., 1997. "Hot Lanes: Introducing Congestion-Pricing One Lane at a Time," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt74n0z81q, University of California Transportation Center.
- Wachs, Martin, 1994. "Will Congestion Pricing Ever Be Adopted?," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt98r1z5rj, University of California Transportation Center.
- Armelius, Hanna & Hultkrantz, Lars, 2006.
"The politico-economic link between public transport and road pricing: An ex-ante study of the Stockholm road-pricing trial,"
Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 162-172, March.
- Hutlkrantz, Lars & Armelius, Hanna, 2005. "The Politico-Economic Link Between Public Transport And Road Pricing: An Ex-Ante Study Of The Stockholm Road-Pricing Trial," Working Papers 2005:8, Örebro University, School of Business.
- Small, Kenneth A., 1992. "Using the Revenues from Congestion Pricing," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt32p9m3mm, University of California Transportation Center.
- Small, Kenneth A., 2001. "Using the Revenues from Congestion Pricing," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt7170x9b0, University of California Transportation Center.
- Calfee, John & Winston, Clifford, 1998. "The value of automobile travel time: implications for congestion policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 83-102, July.
- Deakin, Elizabeth & Harvey, Greig & Pozdena, Randall & Yarema, Geoffrey, 1996. "Transportation Pricing Strategies for California: An Assessment of Congestion, Emissions, Energy. And Equity Impacts," University of California Transportation Center, Working Papers qt723002kt, University of California Transportation Center.
- repec:ucp:bkecon:9781884829987 is not listed on IDEAS
- Eliasson, Jonas & Mattsson, Lars-Göran, 2006. "Equity effects of congestion pricing: Quantitative methodology and a case study for Stockholm," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 40(7), pages 602-620, August.
- Kockelman, Kara M. & Kalmanje, Sukumar, 2005. "Credit-based congestion pricing: a policy proposal and the public's response," Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, Elsevier, vol. 39(7-9), pages 671-690.
- Molly D. Castelazo & Thomas A. Garrett, 2004. "Light rail: boon or boondoggle?," The Regional Economist, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue Jul, pages 12-13. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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