I study a model of geopolitical organization endogenizing the size of nations, their public spending and their degree of openness. The optimal geography may not be a stable equilibrium and a bias toward too many countries tends to emerge. An exogenous increase in openness tends to reduce the size of countries but also to increase the size of their public sectors. When openness is endogenous there can be multiple equilibria, some with globalization backlash associated with large nations and small governments and others with smaller countries, bigger governments and high openness. However, stable equilibria may imply excessive globalization, too many countries and too much government spending. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006
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