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Strategic Export Promotion


  • Federico Etro

    () (Department of Economics, University of Milan-Bicocca)


This paper provides a general characterization of optimal export promoting policies for foreign competitive markets and apply it to strategic trade policy and exchange rate policy. Contrary to the ambiguous results of strategic trade policy under barriers to entry in the third market, I find that it is always optimal to subsidize exports as long as entry is free (under both strategic substitutability and complementarity) and I explicitly derive the optimal export subsidies under Cournot and Bertrand competition. Finally, I show that there is always a strategic incentive to implement competitive devaluations when entry in foreign markets is free, but not otherwise.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Etro, 2006. "Strategic Export Promotion," Working Papers 101, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Oct 2006.
  • Handle: RePEc:mib:wpaper:101

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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

    Cited by:

    1. Federico Etro, 2006. "Political geography," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 321-343, June.
    2. Etro, Federico, 2008. "Growth leaders," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3), pages 1148-1172, September.
    3. Federico Etro, 2006. "Market Leaders and Industrial Policy," Working Papers 103, University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2006.
    4. Federico Etro, 2004. "The Political Economy of Fiscal and Monetary Unions," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 63(3-4), pages 289-328, December.
    5. Tsai, Yingyi & Mukherjee, Arijit & Chen, Jong-Rong, 2016. "Host market competition, foreign FDI and domestic welfare," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 13-22.

    More about this item


    Export Promotion; Strategic Trade policy; Export Subsidies; Competitive Devaluation;

    JEL classification:

    • F12 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Models of Trade with Imperfect Competition and Scale Economies; Fragmentation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F31 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Exchange

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