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The Political Economy of Fiscal and Monetary Unions

  • Federico Etro

    ()

    (UCSC, Milan)

I study the political economy of fiscal unions, where the provision of public goods with spillovers across heterogeneous countries is coordinated, and of monetary unions, where monetary policy is delegated to a supranational authority by countries subject to different shocks. The focus is on the impact of institutional organizations on the size and scope of unions. I provide new results of comparative politics on alternative hierarchies between national and supranational governments choosing on public spending and redistribution, strategic delegation of policymakers under representative democracy and on the role of macroeconomic interdependence in monetary unions.

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File URL: ftp://ftp.gde.unibocconi.it/gde_articles/2004/GDE_V63_N3-4_P289-328.pdf
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Article provided by GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University in its journal Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia.

Volume (Year): 63 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (December)
Pages: 289-328

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Handle: RePEc:gde:journl:gde_v63_n3-4_p289-328
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  30. Economides, George & Miaouli, Natasha, 2006. "Federal transfers, environmental policy and economic growth," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 680-699, December.
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