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The Political Economy of Fiscal and Monetary Unions

Author

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  • Federico Etro

    (UCSC, Milan)

Abstract

I study the political economy of fiscal unions, where the provision of public goods with spillovers across heterogeneous countries is coordinated, and of monetary unions, where monetary policy is delegated to a supranational authority by countries subject to different shocks. The focus is on the impact of institutional organizations on the size and scope of unions. I provide new results of comparative politics on alternative hierarchies between national and supranational governments choosing on public spending and redistribution, strategic delegation of policymakers under representative democracy and on the role of macroeconomic interdependence in monetary unions.

Suggested Citation

  • Federico Etro, 2004. "The Political Economy of Fiscal and Monetary Unions," Giornale degli Economisti, GDE (Giornale degli Economisti e Annali di Economia), Bocconi University, vol. 63(3-4), pages 289-328, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:gde:journl:gde_v63_n3-4_p289-328
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Federico Etro, 2006. "Political geography," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 127(3), pages 321-343, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Political Economy; Fiscal Federalism; Monetary Unions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • E6 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook
    • F0 - International Economics - - General

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