We model an international union as a group of countries deciding together on the provision of public goods or policies that generate spillovers across members. The trade-off between benefits of coordination and loss of independent policymaking endogenously determines size, composition and scope of the union. Policy uniformity reduces the union’s size, may block enlargement processes and induce excessive centralization. We study flexible rules with non-uniform policies that reduce these ine?- ciencies focusing on arrangements relevant in the context of existing unions or federal states, like enhanced cooperation, subsidiarity, federal mandates and earmarked grants.
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- Alberto Alesina & Romain Wacziarg, 1999.
"Is Europe Going Too Far?,"
NBER Working Papers
6883, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Alesina, Alberto & Wacziarg, Romain, 1999. "Is Europe going too far?," Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-42, December.
- Alberto Alesina & Ignazio Angeloni & Federico Etro, 2001.
"Institutional Rules for Federations,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1940, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
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