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Gradualism and uncertainty in international union formation: The European Community’s first enlargement

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  • Nikitas Konstantinidis

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  • Nikitas Konstantinidis, 2008. "Gradualism and uncertainty in international union formation: The European Community’s first enlargement," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 399-433, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:3:y:2008:i:4:p:399-433
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-008-9044-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Nikitas Konstantinidis & Yannis Karagiannis, 2020. "Intrinsic vs. extrinsic incentives for reform: An informational mechanism of E(M)U conditionality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 601-632, July.
    2. Nikitas Konstantinidis & Yannis Karagiannis, 0. "Intrinsic vs. extrinsic incentives for reform: An informational mechanism of E(M)U conditionality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-32.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Gradualism; International unions; Coalition formation; Supranational bargaining; EC enlargement; Charles de Gaulle; F53; C72; D82;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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