Point-Rationalizability in Large Games
In this paper, I characterize point-rationalizability in large non-anonymous games with three di erent formulations of societal responses, and also propose an implicit dynamic process that is informed by Guesnerie's eductive notions. Given the introspection and 'mentalizing' that the point-rationalizability notions presuppose, a motivation behind the work is to examine their viability in situations where the terms rationality and full information can be given a more parsimonious, and thereby more analytically viable, expression.
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