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Voting over Economic Plans

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  • Boylan, Richard T
  • McKelvey, Richard D

Abstract

The authors review and provide motivation for a one-sector model of economic growth in which decisions about capital accumulation are made by a political process. If it is possible to commit for at least three periods into the future, then, for any feasible consumption plan, there is a perturbation that is majority-preferred to it. Furthermore, plans that minimize the maximum vote that can be obtained against them yield a political business cycle. If it is impossible to commit, voters select the optimal consumption plan for the median voter. Copyright 1995 by American Economic Association.

Suggested Citation

  • Boylan, Richard T & McKelvey, Richard D, 1995. "Voting over Economic Plans," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 860-871, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:aea:aecrev:v:85:y:1995:i:4:p:860-71
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    Cited by:

    1. Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2012. "Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(02), pages 407-429, May.
    2. Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2018. "Collective Commitment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(1), pages 347-380.
    3. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 269-299, October.
    4. Walter Hettich & Stanley L. Winer, 2000. "Rules, Politics and the Normative Analysis of Taxation," Carleton Economic Papers 00-12, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 2002.

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