Richard Boylan

Personal Details

First Name:	Richard
Middle Name:
Last Name:	Boylan
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:	pbo7
	http://www.cba.ua.edu/personnel/RichardBoylan.html

Affiliation

Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies
Culverhouse College of Business
University of Alabama-Tuscaloosa

Tuscaloosa, Alabama (United States)
https://efls.culverhouse.ua.edu/
RePEc:edi:defuaus (more details at EDIRC)

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

1. Richard T. Boylan & Naci H. Mocan, 2009. "Intended and Unintended Consequences of Prison Reform," NBER Working Papers 15535, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

   Cited by:

   1. Anna Gunderson, 2021. "Ideology, Disadvantage, and Federal District Court Inmate Civil Rights Filings: The Troubling Effects of Pro Se Status," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 18(3), pages 603-628, September.

2. Richard T Boylan, 1998. "Corruption and staff expenditures in the U.S. Congress," Public Economics 9804002, University Library of Munich, Germany.

   Cited by:

   1. Paul Pautler, 2015. "A Brief History of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics: Reports, Mergers, and Information Regulation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(1), pages 59-94, February.

3. Boylan, R.T., 1997. "Private Bills: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Lobbying," Washington University 97-04, Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University.
   • Richard Boylan, 1998. "Private bills: a theoretical and empirical study of lobbying," Public Economics 9801002, University Library of Munich, Germany.

   Cited by:

   1. Marco M. Sorge, 2014. "Lobbying (Strategically Appointed) Bureaucrats," CSEF Working Papers 380, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
      • Marco Sorge, 2015. "Lobbying (strategically appointed) bureaucrats," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 171-189, June.
   2. Richard T Boylan, 1998. "Corruption and staff expenditures in the U.S. Congress," Public Economics 9804002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   3. Tyutin, Anton & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2017. "On Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty," TSE Working Papers 17-807, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
   4. Didier Laussel & Michel Le Breton, 2005. ""Favors" for Sale: Strategic Analysis of a Simple Menu Auction with Adverse Selection," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 6(1), pages 53-73, May.
      • Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 2005. "Favors for Sale: Strategic Analysis of a Simple Menu Auction with Adverse Selection," IDEI Working Papers 361, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
   5. Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2007. "Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty," IDEI Working Papers 493, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.

4. Richard T. Boylan, 1996. "An optimal auction perspective on lobbying," Public Economics 9602001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   • Richard T. Boylan, 2000. "An optimal auction perspective on lobbying," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(1), pages 55-68.

   Cited by:

   1. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1999. "Political Economics and Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 7097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
      • Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 2002. "Political economics and public finance," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 24, pages 1549-1659, Elsevier.
      • Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, "undated". "Political Economics and Public Finance," Working Papers 149, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
      • Persson, Torsten & Tabellini, Guido, 1999. "Political Economics and Public Finance," CEPR Discussion Papers 2235, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   2. Bertoletti, Paolo, 2006. "On the reserve price in all-pay auctions with complete information and lobbying games," MPRA Paper 1083, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   3. Theo Eicher & Thomas Osang, 2002. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1702-1710, December.
   4. Mikael Priks, 2007. "Judiciaries in Corrupt Societies," CESifo Working Paper Series 2008, CESifo.
      • Mikael Priks, 2011. "Judiciaries in corrupt societies," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 75-88, March.
   5. Mikael Priks, 2012. "Competition among officials and the abuse of power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 425-438, March.

5. Boylan, Richard T., 1990. "Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals," Working Papers 748, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

   Cited by:

   1. Joosten, Reinoud, 1995. "Evolution, dynamics, and fixed points," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
   2. Christopher Ellis & Jon C. Thompson & Jiabin Wu, 2020. "Labor market characteristics and cultural choice," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1584-1617, September.
   3. Desiree A. Desierto, 2008. "The Dynamics of Economic Integration," DEGIT Conference Papers c013_029, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.

6. Boylan, Richard T. & El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., 1990. "Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments," Working Papers 737, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
   • Boylan Richard T. & El-Gamal Mahmoud A., 1993. "Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(2), pages 205-222, April.
   • R. Boylan & E. El-Gamal, 2010. "Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 403, David K. Levine.

   Cited by:

   1. Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2007. "Dumbing down rational players: learning and teaching in an experimental game," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00145436, HAL.
      • Terracol, Antoine & Vaksmann, Jonathan, 2009. "Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 70(1-2), pages 54-71, May.
      • Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2009. "Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) hal-00607223, HAL.
      • Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2009. "Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game," Post-Print hal-00607223, HAL.
      • Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2007. "Dumbing down rational players: learning and teaching in an experimental game," Post-Print halshs-00145436, HAL.
      • Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2009. "Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00607223, HAL.
      • Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2009. "Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game," Post-Print hal-00672292, HAL.
      • Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2007. "Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne bla07017, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
   2. DeJong, D.V. & Blume, A. & Neumann, G., 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," Discussion Paper 1998-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
      • Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & Nathan E. Savin, 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," CIG Working Papers FS IV 98-13, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG).
      • DeJong, D.V. & Blume, A. & Neumann, G., 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," Other publications TiSEM 4a8b4f46-f30b-4ad2-bb0c-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
      • Blume, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Neumann, G.R. & Savin, N.E., 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," Working Papers 98-02, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
   3. Yan Chen & Robert Gazzale, 2004. "When Does Learning in Games Generate Convergence to Nash Equilibria? The Role of Supermodularity in an Experimental Setting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1505-1535, December.
      • Yan Chen & Robert S. Gazzale, 2004. "When Does Learning in Games Generate Convergence to Nash Equilibria? The Role of Supermodularity in an Experimental Setting," Department of Economics Working Papers 2004-02, Department of Economics, Williams College.
   4. Steffen Huck & Johannes Leutgeb & Ryan Oprea, 2017. "Payoff information hampers the evolution of cooperation," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 8(1), pages 1-5, August.
      • Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes & Oprea, Ryan, 2017. "Payoff information hampers the evolution of cooperation," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 8, pages 1-1.
   5. Feltovich, Nick, 1999. "Equilibrium and reinforcement learning in private-information games: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 1605-1632, September.
   6. Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & N. E. Savin, 2002. "Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: an econometric investigation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 225-247.
   7. Marco LiCalzi & Roland Mühlenbernd, 2022. "Feature-weighted categorized play across symmetric games," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 1052-1078, June.
   8. Arifovic, Jasmina & McKelvey, Richard D. & Pevnitskaya, Svetlana, 2006. "An initial implementation of the Turing tournament to learning in repeated two-person games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 93-122, October.
   9. El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1995. "Vertigo: Comparing structural models of imperfect behavior in experimental games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 322-348.
      • El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1992. "Vertigo: Comparing Structural Models of Imperfect Behavior in Experimental Games," Working Papers 800, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
   10. Duffy, John, 2006. "Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 949-1011, Elsevier.
       • John Duffy, 2004. "Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments," Computational Economics 0412001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   11. Backhaus, Teresa & Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes & Oprea, Ryan, 2023. "Learning through period and physical time," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 21-29.
       • Backhaus, Teresa & Huck, Steffen & Leutgeb, Johannes Josef & Oprea, Ryan, 2022. "Learning through period and physical time," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2022-302, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
   12. Theo Offerman & Jan Potters & Joep Sonnemans, 1997. "Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-116/1, Tinbergen Institute.
       • Offerman, T.J.S. & Potters, J.J.M. & Sonnemans, J., 2002. "Imitation and belief learning in an oligopoly experiment," Other publications TiSEM a6a771c5-31ba-4193-8f76-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
       • Theo Offerman & Jan Potters & Joep Sonnemans, 2002. "Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 69(4), pages 973-997.
   13. Christos A. Ioannou & Julian Romero, 2012. "Strategic Learning With Finite Automata Via The EWA-Lite Model," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1269, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
   14. Mookherjee, Dilip & Sopher, Barry, 1997. "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 97-132, April.
       • Barry Sopher & Dilip Mookherjee, 2000. "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Departmental Working Papers 199625, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
       • Barry Sopher & Dilip Mookherjee, 1997. "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Departmental Working Papers 199527, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
   15. George R. Neumann & Nathan E. Savin, 2000. "Learning and Communication in Sender-Receiver Games: An Econometric Investigation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1852, Econometric Society.
   16. Nick Feltovich, 2000. "Reinforcement-Based vs. Belief-Based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 605-642, May.
   17. Hoffmann, Eric, 2016. "On the learning and stability of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in games of strategic substitutes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 349-362.
   18. Timothy C. Salmon, 2001. "An Evaluation of Econometric Models of Adaptive Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1597-1628, November.
   19. Kovarik, Jaromir & Mengel, Friederike & Romero, José Gabriel, 2012. "Learning in Network Games," IKERLANAK http://www-fae1-eao1-ehu-, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
       • Jaromír Kovářík & Friederike Mengel & José Gabriel Romero, 2018. "Learning in network games," Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), pages 85-139, March.
   20. Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel, 1997. "Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 46-76, April.
   21. Van Huyck, John B & Cook, Joseph P & Battalio, Raymond C, 1994. "Selection Dynamics, Asymptotic Stability, and Adaptive Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 975-1005, October.
   22. Blume, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Neumann, G. & Savin, N.E., 2000. "Learning and Communication in Sender-Reciever Games : An Economic Investigation," Discussion Paper 2000-09, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
       • Blume, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Neumann, G. & Savin, N.E., 2000. "Learning and Communication in Sender-Reciever Games : An Economic Investigation," Other publications TiSEM 138dc36b-5269-421a-9e79-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
   23. Dickhaut, John & Ledyard, Margaret & Mukherji, Arijit & Sapra, Haresh, 2003. "Information management and valuation: an experimental investigation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 26-53, July.

7. Boylan, Richard. & Ledyard, John O. & McKelvey, Richard D., "undated". "Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results," Working Papers 780, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
   • Richard T. Boylan & Richard D. McKelvey & John Ledyard, 1996. "Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 191-205.

   Cited by:

   1. Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2016. "Collective Commitment," Working Papers 933, Barcelona School of Economics.
      • Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2015. "Collective Commitment," Vienna Economics Papers vie1507, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
      • Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2016. "Collective commitment," Economics Working Papers 1540, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
      • Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2018. "Collective Commitment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(1), pages 347-380.
   2. Mikhail Pakhnin, 2021. "Collective Choice with Heterogeneous Time Preferences," CESifo Working Paper Series 9141, CESifo.
   3. Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas, 2011. "Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2011-205, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
      • Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2012. "Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 908-909, November.
      • Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2012. "Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 407-429, May.
   4. Borissov, Kirill & Pakhnin, Mikhail & Puppe, Clemens, 2015. "On discounting and voting in a simple growth model," Working Paper Series in Economics 77, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
      • Borissov, Kirill & Pakhnin, Mikhail & Puppe, Clemens, 2017. "On discounting and voting in a simple growth model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 56-76.
      • Borissov, Kirill & Pakhnin, Mikhail & Puppe, Clemens, 2017. "On discounting and voting in a simple growth model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 94(C), pages 185-204.
      • Kirill Borissov & Mikhail Pakhnin & Clemens Puppe, 2016. "On Discounting and Voting in a Simple Growth Model," CEEES Paper Series CE3S-02/16, European University at St. Petersburg, Department of Economics.

Articles

1. Richard T. Boylan, 2000. "An optimal auction perspective on lobbying," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(1), pages 55-68.
   • Richard T. Boylan, 1996. "An optimal auction perspective on lobbying," Public Economics 9602001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
   See citations under working paper version above.
2. Richard T. Boylan & Richard D. McKelvey & John Ledyard, 1996. "Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 191-205.
   • Boylan, Richard. & Ledyard, John O. & McKelvey, Richard D., "undated". "Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results," Working Papers 780, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
   See citations under working paper version above.
3. Boylan, Richard T & McKelvey, Richard D, 1995. "Voting over Economic Plans," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 860-871, September.

   Cited by:

   1. Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2016. "Collective Commitment," Working Papers 933, Barcelona School of Economics.
      • Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2015. "Collective Commitment," Vienna Economics Papers vie1507, University of Vienna, Department of Economics.
      • Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2016. "Collective commitment," Economics Working Papers 1540, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
      • Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2018. "Collective Commitment," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 126(1), pages 347-380.
   2. Walter Hettich & Stanley L. Winer, 2000. "Rules, Politics and the Normative Analysis of Taxation," Carleton Economic Papers 00-12, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 2002.
   3. Rick K. Wilson, 2005. "Classroom Games: Candidate Convergence," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 71(4), pages 913-922, April.
   4. Mikhail Pakhnin, 2021. "Collective Choice with Heterogeneous Time Preferences," CESifo Working Paper Series 9141, CESifo.
   5. Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas, 2011. "Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2011-205, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
      • Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2012. "Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(4), pages 908-909, November.
      • Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas R., 2012. "Legislative Bargaining and the Dynamics of Public Investment," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(2), pages 407-429, May.
   6. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 269-299, October.
      • John Duggan & Jeffrey S. Banks, 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces," Wallis Working Papers WP53, University of Rochester - Wallis Institute of Political Economy.
   7. Muhammad Shahid Akram & Toseef Azid, 2006. "Economics of Regaining Office: The Case of Pakistan (1947-2005)," The Pakistan Development Review, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, vol. 45(4), pages 913-923.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.

1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 1998-10-02
2. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (1) 1998-10-02
3. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 1998-10-02
4. NEP-PUB: Public Finance (1) 1998-10-02

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Richard Boylan should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.