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Richard Boylan

Personal Details

First Name:Richard
Middle Name:
Last Name:Boylan
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pbo7
http://www.cba.ua.edu/personnel/RichardBoylan.html

Affiliation

Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies
Culverhouse College of Business
University of Alabama-Tuscaloosa

Tuscaloosa, Alabama (United States)
https://efls.culverhouse.ua.edu/
RePEc:edi:defuaus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Richard T. Boylan & Naci H. Mocan, 2009. "Intended and Unintended Consequences of Prison Reform," NBER Working Papers 15535, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Richard Boylan & Cheryl Xiaoning Long, 2000. "Size, Monitoring and Plea Rate: An Examination of United States Attorneys," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0089, Econometric Society.
  3. Richard T Boylan, 1998. "Corruption and staff expenditures in the U.S. Congress," Public Economics 9804002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  4. Boylan, R.T., 1997. "Private Bills: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Lobbying," Washington University 97-04, Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University.
  5. Richard T. Boylan, 1996. "An optimal auction perspective on lobbying," Public Economics 9602001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  6. Boylan, Richard., 1990. "Equilibria Resistant to Mutation," Working Papers 729, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  7. Boylan, Richard T., 1990. "Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals," Working Papers 748, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  8. Boylan, Richard T. & El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., 1990. "Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments," Working Papers 737, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  9. Boylan, Richard. & Ledyard, John O. & McKelvey, Richard D., "undated". "Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results," Working Papers 780, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  10. Richard T. Boylan & Bente Villadsen, "undated". "Contracting and Income Smoothing in an Infinite Agency Model," Computing in Economics and Finance 1997 38, Society for Computational Economics.
  11. Richard T. Boylan & Bente Villadsen, "undated". "A Bellman's Equation for the Study of Income Smoothing," Computing in Economics and Finance 1996 _009, Society for Computational Economics.

Articles

  1. Richard T. Boylan, 2000. "An optimal auction perspective on lobbying," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(1), pages 55-68.
  2. Richard T. Boylan & Richard D. McKelvey & John Ledyard, 1996. "Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 191-205.
  3. Boylan, Richard T & McKelvey, Richard D, 1995. "Voting over Economic Plans," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 860-871, September.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Richard T Boylan, 1998. "Corruption and staff expenditures in the U.S. Congress," Public Economics 9804002, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Paul Pautler, 2015. "A Brief History of the FTC’s Bureau of Economics: Reports, Mergers, and Information Regulation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 46(1), pages 59-94, February.

  2. Boylan, R.T., 1997. "Private Bills: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Lobbying," Washington University 97-04, Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University.

    Cited by:

    1. Marco M. Sorge, 2014. "Lobbying (Strategically Appointed) Bureaucrats," CSEF Working Papers 380, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    2. Richard T Boylan, 1998. "Corruption and staff expenditures in the U.S. Congress," Public Economics 9804002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Tyutin, Anton & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2017. "On Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty," TSE Working Papers 17-807, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    4. Didier Laussel & Michel Le Breton, 2005. ""Favors" for Sale: Strategic Analysis of a Simple Menu Auction with Adverse Selection," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 6(1), pages 53-73, May.
    5. Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2007. "Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty," IDEI Working Papers 493, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.

  3. Richard T. Boylan, 1996. "An optimal auction perspective on lobbying," Public Economics 9602001, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Torsten Persson & Guido Tabellini, 1999. "Political Economics and Public Finance," NBER Working Papers 7097, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    2. Bertoletti, Paolo, 2006. "On the reserve price in all-pay auctions with complete information and lobbying games," MPRA Paper 1083, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Theo Eicher & Thomas Osang, 2002. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1702-1710, December.
    4. Mikael Priks, 2007. "Judiciaries in Corrupt Societies," CESifo Working Paper Series 2008, CESifo.
    5. Mikael Priks, 2012. "Competition among officials and the abuse of power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(3), pages 425-438, March.

  4. Boylan, Richard., 1990. "Equilibria Resistant to Mutation," Working Papers 729, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

    Cited by:

    1. Richard T. Boylan, 1997. "Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Random Matched Individuals," Levine's Working Paper Archive 845, David K. Levine.
    2. William Harms, 1997. "Evolution And Ultimatum Bargaining," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 147-175, March.
    3. John O. Ledyard, 1994. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Public Economics 9405003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 May 1994.

  5. Boylan, Richard T., 1990. "Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals," Working Papers 748, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

    Cited by:

    1. Joosten, Reinoud, 1995. "Evolution, dynamics, and fixed points," Research Memorandum 005, Maastricht University, Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT).
    2. Christopher J. Ellis & Jon C. Thompson & Jiabin Wu, 2016. "Complementarities, Coordination, and Culture," CESifo Working Paper Series 5949, CESifo.
    3. Warneryd, Karl, 2002. "Rent, risk, and replication: Preference adaptation in winner-take-all markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 41(2), pages 344-364, November.
    4. Daniel Friedman, 1998. "On economic applications of evolutionary game theory," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 15-43.
    5. DEMICHELIS, Stefano & RITZBERGER, Klaus, 2000. "From evolutionary to strategic stability," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2000059, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    6. Björnerstedt, Jonas & Weibull, Jörgen W., 1994. "Nash Equilibrium and Evolution by Imitation," Working Paper Series 407, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    7. Christopher Ellis & Jon C. Thompson & Jiabin Wu, 2020. "Labor market characteristics and cultural choice," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1584-1617, September.
    8. Desiree A. Desierto, 2008. "The Dynamics of Economic Integration," DEGIT Conference Papers c013_029, DEGIT, Dynamics, Economic Growth, and International Trade.

  6. Boylan, Richard T. & El-Gamal, Mahmoud A., 1990. "Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments," Working Papers 737, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

    Cited by:

    1. Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2007. "Dumbing down rational players : learning and teaching in an experimental game," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00145436, HAL.
    2. DeJong, D.V. & Blume, A. & Neumann, G., 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," Discussion Paper 1998-28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Yan Chen & Robert Gazzale, 2004. "When Does Learning in Games Generate Convergence to Nash Equilibria? The Role of Supermodularity in an Experimental Setting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(5), pages 1505-1535, December.
    4. Steffen Huck & Johannes Leutgeb & Ryan Oprea, 2017. "Payoff information hampers the evolution of cooperation," Nature Communications, Nature, vol. 8(1), pages 1-5, August.
    5. John O. Ledyard, 1994. "Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research," Public Economics 9405003, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 22 May 1994.
    6. Feltovich, Nick, 1999. "Equilibrium and reinforcement learning in private-information games: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 23(9-10), pages 1605-1632, September.
    7. Andreas Blume & Douglas V. DeJong & George R. Neumann & N. E. Savin, 2002. "Learning and communication in sender-receiver games: an econometric investigation," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 225-247.
    8. V. Crawford, 2010. "Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 404, David K. Levine.
    9. Jasmina Arifovic & John Ledyard, 2018. "Learning to alternate," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 21(3), pages 692-721, September.
    10. Arifovic, Jasmina & McKelvey, Richard D. & Pevnitskaya, Svetlana, 2006. "An initial implementation of the Turing tournament to learning in repeated two-person games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(1), pages 93-122, October.
    11. El-Gamal, Mahmoud A. & Palfrey, Thomas R., 1995. "Vertigo: Comparing structural models of imperfect behavior in experimental games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 322-348.
    12. Duffy, John, 2006. "Agent-Based Models and Human Subject Experiments," Handbook of Computational Economics, in: Leigh Tesfatsion & Kenneth L. Judd (ed.), Handbook of Computational Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 19, pages 949-1011, Elsevier.
    13. Theo Offerman & Jan Potters & Joep Sonnemans, 1997. "Imitation and Belief Learning in an Oligopoly Experiment," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-116/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    14. Christos A. Ioannou & Julian Romero, 2012. "Strategic Learning With Finite Automata Via The EWA-Lite Model," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1269, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    15. Mookherjee, Dilip & Sopher, Barry, 1997. "Learning and Decision Costs in Experimental Constant Sum Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 97-132, April.
    16. George R. Neumann & Nathan E. Savin, 2000. "Learning and Communication in Sender-Receiver Games: An Econometric Investigation," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1852, Econometric Society.
    17. Nick Feltovich, 2000. "Reinforcement-Based vs. Belief-Based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(3), pages 605-642, May.
    18. Hoffmann, Eric, 2016. "On the learning and stability of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in games of strategic substitutes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 130(C), pages 349-362.
    19. Timothy C. Salmon, 2001. "An Evaluation of Econometric Models of Adaptive Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(6), pages 1597-1628, November.
    20. Kovarik, Jaromir & Mengel, Friederike & Romero, José Gabriel, 2012. "Learning in Network Games," IKERLANAK Ikerlanak;2012-66, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    21. Cheung, Yin-Wong & Friedman, Daniel, 1997. "Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 19(1), pages 46-76, April.
    22. DeJong, D.V. & Blume, A. & Neumann, G., 1998. "Learning in Sender-Receiver Games," Other publications TiSEM 4a8b4f46-f30b-4ad2-bb0c-1, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    23. Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2009. "Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00607223, HAL.
    24. Van Huyck, John B & Cook, Joseph P & Battalio, Raymond C, 1994. "Selection Dynamics, Asymptotic Stability, and Adaptive Behavior," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 975-1005, October.
    25. Blume, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Neumann, G. & Savin, N.E., 2000. "Learning and Communication in Sender-Reciever Games : An Economic Investigation," Discussion Paper 2000-09, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    26. Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2009. "Dumbing down rational players: Learning and teaching in an experimental game," Post-Print hal-00607223, HAL.
    27. Antoine Terracol & Jonathan Vaksmann, 2007. "Dumbing down rational players : learning and teaching in an experimental game," Post-Print halshs-00145436, HAL.
    28. Blume, A. & DeJong, D.V. & Neumann, G. & Savin, N.E., 2000. "Learning and Communication in Sender-Reciever Games : An Economic Investigation," Other publications TiSEM 138dc36b-5269-421a-9e79-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    29. Martin Sefton, 1999. "A Model of Behavior in Coordination Game Experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 2(2), pages 151-164, December.

  7. Boylan, Richard. & Ledyard, John O. & McKelvey, Richard D., "undated". "Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results," Working Papers 780, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.

    Cited by:

    1. Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2016. "Collective Commitment," Working Papers 933, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    2. Mikhail Pakhnin, 2021. "Collective Choice with Heterogeneous Time Preferences," CESifo Working Paper Series 9141, CESifo.
    3. Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas, 2011. "Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2011-205, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    4. Borissov, Kirill & Pakhnin, Mikhail & Puppe, Clemens, 2015. "On discounting and voting in a simple growth model," Working Paper Series in Economics 77, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.

Articles

  1. Richard T. Boylan, 2000. "An optimal auction perspective on lobbying," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 17(1), pages 55-68.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Richard T. Boylan & Richard D. McKelvey & John Ledyard, 1996. "Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 7(2), pages 191-205.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Boylan, Richard T & McKelvey, Richard D, 1995. "Voting over Economic Plans," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(4), pages 860-871, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Christian Roessler & Sandro Shelegia & Bruno Strulovici, 2016. "Collective Commitment," Working Papers 933, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    2. Walter Hettich & Stanley L. Winer, 2000. "Rules, Politics and the Normative Analysis of Taxation," Carleton Economic Papers 00-12, Carleton University, Department of Economics, revised 2002.
    3. Mikhail Pakhnin, 2021. "Collective Choice with Heterogeneous Time Preferences," CESifo Working Paper Series 9141, CESifo.
    4. Battaglini, Marco & Nunnari, Salvatore & Palfrey, Thomas, 2011. "Legislative bargaining and the dynamics of public investment," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2011-205, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    5. Banks, Jeffrey S. & Duggan, John, 2008. "A Dynamic Model of Democratic Elections in Multidimensional Policy Spaces," Quarterly Journal of Political Science, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 269-299, October.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 1998-10-02
  2. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (1) 1998-10-02
  3. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 1998-10-02
  4. NEP-PUB: Public Finance (1) 1998-10-02

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