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Private Bills: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Lobbying

  • Boylan, R.T.

The number of private bills passed in a year represents the extent with which Congress wants to make administrative decisions instead of delegating these decisions to the bureaucracy. Scandalous behavior by Coongresspersons has affected the number of private bills by changing the voter's belief of the likelihood that a Congressperson is a crook. Congresspersons are less likely to be willing to introduce a private bill and Congress passes public laws that delegate administrative decisions to the bureaucracy.

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Paper provided by Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University in its series Washington University with number 97-04.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:wablec:97-04
Contact details of provider: Postal: Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University. Campus Box 1133, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis MO 63130-4899.
Web page: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/ble/

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