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Private Bills: A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Lobbying

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Listed author(s):
  • Boylan, R.T.

Abstract

The number of private bills passed in a year represents the extent with which Congress wants to make administrative decisions instead of delegating these decisions to the bureaucracy. Scandalous behavior by Coongresspersons has affected the number of private bills by changing the voter's belief of the likelihood that a Congressperson is a crook. Congresspersons are less likely to be willing to introduce a private bill and Congress passes public laws that delegate administrative decisions to the bureaucracy.

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Paper provided by Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University in its series Washington University with number 97-04.

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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Handle: RePEc:fth:wablec:97-04
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University. Campus Box 1133, One Brookings Drive, St. Louis MO 63130-4899.

Web page: http://www.olin.wustl.edu/ble/

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Keywords: DECISION MAKING;

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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  1. Kroszner, Randall S & Stratmann, Thomas, 1998. "Interest-Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(5), pages 1163-1187, December.
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Cited by:

  1. Richard T Boylan, 1998. "Corruption and staff expenditures in the U.S. Congress," Public Economics 9804002, EconWPA.
  2. Didier Laussel & Michel Le Breton, 2005. ""Favors" for Sale: Strategic Analysis of a Simple Menu Auction with Adverse Selection," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 6(1), pages 53-73, May.
  3. Marco Sorge, 2015. "Lobbying (strategically appointed) bureaucrats," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 171-189, June.
  4. Le Breton, Michel & Zaporozhets, Vera, 2007. "Legislative Lobbying under Political Uncertainty," IDEI Working Papers 493, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.

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