Higher Bars for Incumbents and Experience
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References listed on IDEAS
- Shi, Min & Svensson, Jakob, 2006. "Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(8-9), pages 1367-1389, September.
- Hodler, Roland & Loertscher, Simon & Rohner, Dominic, 2010.
"Inefficient policies and incumbency advantage,"
Journal of Public Economics,
Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 761-767, October.
- Hodler, R. & Loertscher , S. & Rohner, D., 2007. "Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0738, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
- Roland Hodler & Simon Loertscher & Dominic Rohner, 2007. "Inefficient Policies and Incumbency Advantage," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 996, The University of Melbourne.
More about this item
Keywordselections; experience; incumbency advantage; political contracts; vote-share thresholds;
- D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-06-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-06-25 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2012-06-25 (Positive Political Economics)
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