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Suspiciously timed trade disputes

Author

Listed:
  • Paola Conconi
  • David De Remer
  • Georg Kirchsteiger
  • Lorenzo Trimarchi
  • Maurizio Zanardi

Abstract

This paper shows that electoral incentives crucially affect the initiation of trade disputes. Focusing on WTO disputes filed by the United States during the 1995–2014 period, we find that U.S. presidents are more likely to initiate a dispute in the year preceding their re-election. Moreover, U.S. trade disputes are more likely to involve industries that are important in swing states. To explain these regularities, we develop a theoreticalmodel in which re-election motives can lead an incumbent politician to file trade disputes to appeal to voters motivated by reciprocity.

Suggested Citation

  • Paola Conconi & David De Remer & Georg Kirchsteiger & Lorenzo Trimarchi & Maurizio Zanardi, 2017. "Suspiciously timed trade disputes," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/242517, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    • Handle: RePEc:ulb:ulbeco:2013/242517
    Note: SCOPUS: ar.j
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    Cited by:

    1. Rotunno, Lorenzo, 2016. "Political stability and trade agreements: Evidence for ‘endgame FTAs’," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 133-148.
    2. Arevik Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan & Hoffstadt, 2020. "Use and Abuse of Antidumping by Global Cartels," CESifo Working Paper Series 8729, CESifo.
    3. Aquilante, Tommaso, 2018. "Undeflected pressure? The protectionist effect of political partisanship on US antidumping policy," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 455-470.
    4. Kuenzel, David J., 2017. "WTO dispute determinants," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 157-179.
    5. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2019. "Modelling kindness," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 167(C), pages 228-234.
    6. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2022. "Belief-Dependent Motivations and Psychological Game Theory," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 833-882, September.
    7. Leonardi, Marco & Meschi, Elena, 2021. "Do Non-tariff Barriers to Trade Save American Jobs and Wages?," IZA Discussion Papers 14162, IZA Network @ LISER.
    8. Antonis Adam & Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2024. "Conflict under the shadow of elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 173-199, July.
    9. Benedikt Heid & Laura Márquez-Ramos & Harry Wardana, 2025. "Trade Restrictions as Effective Industrial Policy? Evidence from Indonesia's Import Licensing Scheme," CESifo Working Paper Series 12346, CESifo.
    10. Chad Brown & Paola Conconi & Aksel Erbahar & Lorenzo Trimarchi, 2020. "Trade Protection Along Supply Chains," Working Papers ECARES 2020-52, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    11. Lu, Yi & Tao, Zhigang & Zhang, Yan, 2018. "How do exporters adjust export product scope and product mix to react to antidumping?," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 20-41.
    12. Taipeng Li & Lorenzo Trimarchi & Guohao Yang & Rui Xie, 2023. "The Unintended Consequences of Trade Protection on the Environment," DeFiPP Working Papers 2303, University of Namur, Development Finance and Public Policies.
    13. Chen, Xiangyu & Tongurai, Jittima, 2023. "Informational linkage and price discovery between China's futures and spot markets: Evidence from the US–China trade dispute," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 55(C).
    14. Lorenzo Trimarchi, 2020. "Trade Policy and the China Syndrome," SERIES 05-2020, Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza - Università degli Studi di Bari "Aldo Moro", revised May 2020.
    15. Liebman, Benjamin H. & Reynolds, Kara M., 2022. "Casualties of trade wars," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 148(C).
    16. Li, Taipeng & Trimarchi, Lorenzo & Xie, Rui & Yang, Guohao, 2026. "The unintended consequences of trade protection on the environment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 178(C).
    17. Maggi, Giovanni & Staiger, Robert W., 2020. "Learning by ruling and trade disputes," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    18. Akihiko Kawaura & Yasutomo Kimura & Yuzu Uchida, 2024. "Deeds, not words? Speech and re-election of Japan’s local legislators," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 123-140, March.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations

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