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Political stability and trade agreements: Evidence for ‘endgame FTAs’

Author

Listed:
  • Lorenzo Rotunno

    (GREQAM - Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille - EHESS - École des hautes études en sciences sociales - AMU - Aix Marseille Université - ECM - École Centrale de Marseille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique)

Abstract

This paper empirically examines the idea that Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) are more likely to be signed by governments playing ‘endgames'; that is, when governments are about to lose power. Two empirical strategies shed light on this hypothesis. One relies on events that increase the probability of political turnover, the other on term limits. I find that countries are more likely to sign FTAs after the unexpected exit of their leaders, when political instability is high. The key finding is partly confirmed in the term-limits strategy as governments are found to form more FTAs during their last term in office.

Suggested Citation

  • Lorenzo Rotunno, 2016. "Political stability and trade agreements: Evidence for ‘endgame FTAs’," Post-Print hal-01447843, HAL.
    • Handle: RePEc:hal:journl:hal-01447843
    DOI: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.10.006
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    Cited by:

    1. Vu, Trung V., 2022. "Unbundling the effect of political instability on income redistribution," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
    2. Emanuel Ornelas, 2025. "Political Competition and the Strategic Adoption of Free Trade Agreements," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 380-392, May.
    3. Chan, Christine M. & Shi, Lei & Li, Yiwei, 2025. "When do transnational institutions matter for multinational corporations’ location choices?," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 199(C).
    4. Yi Yi Mon & Seunghoo Lim & Makoto Kakinaka, 2019. "Multiplex Relations between States: Coevolution of Trade Agreements and Political Alliances," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(14), pages 1-24, July.
    5. Peiró-Palomino, Jesús & Rodríguez-Crespo, Ernesto & Suárez-Varela, Marta, 2022. "Do countries with higher institutional quality transition to cleaner trade?," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 201(C).
    6. Ehsan Rasoulinezhad, 2020. "Energy Trade and Economic Integration between the Commonwealth Independent States and China," Journal of Economic Integration, Center for Economic Integration, Sejong University, vol. 35(1), pages 172-190.
    7. Daryna Grechyna, 2018. "Shall We Riot Too? The Geographical Neighbor Impact on Political Instability," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 71(4), pages 581-612, November.
    8. Alassane D. Yeo & Aimin Deng, 2019. "The trade policy effect in international trade: case of Pakistan," Journal of Economic Structures, Springer;Pan-Pacific Association of Input-Output Studies (PAPAIOS), vol. 8(1), pages 1-17, December.
    9. Muhammad Shahbaz & Bekhzod Kuziboev & Sardor Allayarov & Kamil Pícha & A. Nazif Çatık, 2025. "Political stability in Europe: the effect of energy uncertainty," Economia Politica: Journal of Analytical and Institutional Economics, Springer;Fondazione Edison, vol. 42(1), pages 1-23, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • F13 - International Economics - - Trade - - - Trade Policy; International Trade Organizations
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations

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